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Abstract
Oklahoma is presently experiencing a higher rate of earthquake activity than historically
observed. Historical data on earthquake-induced damage to Oklahoma bridges is lim-
ited, so the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) is concerned about their
bridges. The first part of this research develops smart inspection radii for ODOT. These
radii incorporate both the demand on and capacity of Oklahoma bridges. Demand is
quantified by the ground-motion intensity, in this case spectral acceleration at a period
of 1.0 s (S 1). Capacity is characterized by HAZUS fragility curves for bridges. Then,
Oklahoma ground motions are compared to current attenuation models. Current models
tend to over predict Oklahoma shaking levels, so a bias factor was calibrated to better
represent Oklahoma earthquake attenuation. This is followed by performing a seismic
response analysis for the Interstate 35 bridge over the Cimarron River located approxi-
mately 40 miles north of Oklahoma City in Logan County, Oklahoma. The results from
this study can also be used to verify and adjust the fragility curve parameters needed
for the development of ShakeCast–OK. Seismic response analysis has shown that the
potential for structural damage is low under the considered loading conditions. Finally,
ShakeCast–OK is developed. This real-time program sends notifications to ODOT indi-
cating which bridges to inspect after an earthquake. This saves ODOT time and money





In this chapter seismicity in Oklahoma will be introduced. Then, a plan for improving
the Oklahoma Department of Transportation’s (ODOT) post bridge inspection protocol
will be provided. Finally, established methods for developing bridge fragility curves
will be discussed.
1.2 Seismicity in Oklahoma
Since 2009, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of earthquakes in Ok-
lahoma (Fig. 1.1). Oklahoma and the surrounding region have not historically experi-
enced earthquakes of this magnitude nor at the rate currently observed (McGarr et al.,
2015) (Fig. 1.2). Studies such as by Keranen et al. (2013) have linked the increased rate
of seismic activity since 2009 to wastewater injection in disposal wells. The only identi-
fied source of natural (tectonic) earthquakes in this region is the Meers fault in southwest
Oklahoma, as reflected in the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) national seismic hazard
maps (Petersen et al., 2014) and accordingly the mapped design ground motion data
provided by the 2009 AASHTO Guide Specifications for LRFD Seismic Bridge Design
(AASHTO, 2009). In 2016, the USGS made an effort incorporate non-tectonic earth-




Figure 1.1: Magnitude 3.0 and larger earthquakes in Oklahoma in (a) 2002 (≈ 4) and (b) 2014
(≈ 585) (USGS, 2015b).
2016), but these are not reflected in seismic design provisions. Therefore, concern has
arisen about how Oklahoma’s infrastructure will handle the increased seismic demand.
In particular, ODOT is concerned about their bridges’ response to earthquakes and the
potential for damage.
1.2.1 Significant Oklahoma Earthquakes
Over the past decade (2008–2017), Oklahoma experienced over 80 magnitude 4.0
(M4.0) or larger events, including four M5.0 or larger events. The first of these
2
Figure 1.2: Annual Central U.S. Earthquakes 1973-2016 (USGS, 2017a).
events was a M5.7* earthquake that occurred on 6 November 2011, near Prague,
Oklahoma (USGS, 2016c). Several years passed before the next significant event, the
13 February 2016, M5.1 earthquake near Fairview, Oklahoma (USGS, 2016b). The
largest earthquake Oklahoma has experienced to date would come later that year. At
12:02:44 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on 3 September 2016, a M5.8 earthquake
struck 15 km northwest of Pawnee, Oklahoma. The event was triggered by strike-slip
faulting within the interior of the North America plate (USGS, 2016d), at a focal depth
of 5.6 km. A fourth large event (M5.0) occurred on 7 November 2016 near Cushing,
Oklahoma (USGS, 2016a). These M5.0 and larger events were felt in the surrounding
states, caused damage to residential structures, and resulted in minor injuries (Taylor
et al., 2017).
*Prior to 7 September 2016, USGS estimated the 6 November 2011 Prague, Oklahoma earthquake
to be M5.6, but updated the estimate following the 3 September 2016 Pawnee, Oklahoma earthquake
(USGS, 2016f). Hereinafter, M5.7 will be used when referring to this event, except for in Chapter 2.
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1.2.2 History of ODOT’s Post-Earthquake Inspection Protocol
When the earthquake activity began to increase, ODOT needed to determine when and
how to inspect their bridges after an earthquake. Their initial response was to inspect
after every earthquake with a magnitude greater than 3.0. However, as time went on,
they found this to be overly conservative.
On 23 January 2015, ODOT changed the protocol to dictate that bridges must be
inspected within a 5 mile radius for earthquakes with magnitudes from 4.0 to 4.9, within
a 25 mile radius for earthquakes with magnitudes from 5.0 to 5.5, and within a 50
mile radius for earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 5.5. If damage was found
within those radii, the inspection radius was expanded by 5 miles (W. L. Peters, personal
communication, February 2017).
This inspection protocol resulted in inspections for over 30 earthquakes in 2015, yet
no earthquake-related damage to the bridges was found. ODOT felt even this was too
much and wanted to establish an evidence-based, rigorous procedure, so in 2015 they
hired a team of consultants led by Infrastructure Engineers, Inc. to revise their post-
earthquake bridge inspection protocol. This contract consisted of two phases: Phase I,
which would establish an interim post-earthquake bridge inspection protocol (Chapter
2), and Phase II, which would develop ShakeCast-OK (Chapter 5). On 1 April 2016, the
interim protocol was implemented. ShakeCast-OK will become operational in 2017.
1.2.3 Improving ODOT’s Inspection Protocol
California is a leader in earthquake response, so their post-earthquake protocol was a
reasonable place to start to find a solution for Oklahoma bridges. After an earthquake
in California, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) sends prioritized
bridge inspection lists to their response teams, optimizing the bridge inspection process
and ensuring that the bridges most likely to be damaged are inspected first.
4
Figure 1.3: A ShakeMap for the 2011 Prague earthquake (USGS, 2015b).
Several steps go into creating these prioritized bridge inspection lists. First, a ground
motion attenuation model is chosen for the affected region. This model is used in con-
junction with ShakeMap (USGS, 2015b), an online component of the USGS, which
creates a map after an earthquake showing the shaking levels in the area (Fig. 1.3). The
ShakeMap is then sent to ShakeMap Broadcast (ShakeCast), an online resource from
USGS (2017b), and combined with information about the bridges, such as their loca-
tions and fragility curves. The shaking intensity at the bridge sites and the bridges’
fragility curves are evaluated to create a list that shows the bridges that are most likely
to be damaged.
Fragility curves mathematically represent the predicted probability that the demand
5
Figure 1.4: Examples of different damage states (adapted from Shinozuka et al. (2003)).
on a bridge will exceed the bridge’s theoretical capacity (Mander, 1999). Several dif-
ferent methods are available to calculate fragility curves. One of the simplest methods
is to use the Hazard U.S. (HAZUS) generalized bridge fragility curves (FEMA, 2003).
However, for a more in-depth analysis of a particular bridge, a more analytical method
must be used.
1.3 Bridge Fragility Curves
After an earthquake, it is important to quickly assess how much of the infrastructure
has been damaged so that those structures can be closed for public safety. Sending
inspectors to examine the structures is the only certain way to check for damage. How-
ever, because response crews often have limited personnel in the area that needs to be
inspected, it is important to find a way to prioritize the structures. Fragility curves are
one way to accomplish this: they estimate the damage level of structures based on the
level of ground shaking they experience due to an earthquake (FEMA, 2003). A fragility
curve statistically describes where the calculated demand on a structure exceeds the the-
oretical capacity of the structure. This is shown by plotting the probability of exceeding
a given damage (limit) state (Fig. 1.4) as a function of the ground-motion intensity.
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1.3.1 History of Fragility Curves
Several different methods have been used to develop structural fragilities, including ex-
pert testimony, empirical data, and analytical modeling. A summary of the methodology
and a description of the pros and cons are given for each of these approaches.
The expert-based functions presented in the Applied Technology Council 13 (ATC-
13) report were one of the earliest examples of fragility functions (ATC, 1985). Because
there was very little recorded data available at the time with which to generate damage
probability matrices (DPMs), the ATC assembled a panel of 42 experts to fill out a
questionnaire concerning the various components of typical Californian infrastructure.
Four of these experts were chosen to provide opinions for highway bridges (ATC, 1985).
The questionnaire asked the experts to estimate a bridge’s probability of being in a
certain damage state based on a Modified-Mercalli Intensity (MMI) value. These results
were examined and used to create DPMs for the ATC-13 and ATC-25 reports (ATC,
1991).
Expert-based fragility functions are the least reliable of the fragility functions. This
is in part caused by the subjectivity of the input received; when the DPMs are compared
to actual earthquake damage reports, little, if any, correlation has been found (Nielson,
2005). Additionally, the DPMs make it very difficult to develop accurate predictions
for an individual bridge because only two types of bridges, those over 500 ft. and those
under 500 ft., are included (Nielson, 2005). Furthermore, this data was based on Cal-
ifornian infrastructure, so its application to the Central and Eastern U.S. (CEUS) is
questionable.
Empirical fragility curves are based on actual earthquake data, so they are easier to
create and more accurate when a lot data is available. This quantity of data only occurs
for earthquakes with large magnitudes that have damaged many bridges of different
types. As a result of these limitations, several empirical fragility functions have been
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developed using data from the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes in-
cluding Basoz and Kiremidjian (1997), Der Kiureghian (2002), Shinozuka et al. (2003),
Elnashai et al. (2004), and Shinozukaet al. (2000). This data was compiled into a list
of the bridge type, damage state, and level of shaking for all bridges in the affected area
and was used to create a damage frequency matrix (Basoz and Kiremidjian, 1997).
While the empirical fragility curves are more accurate than the expert-based func-
tions, there are still some limitations. The variety of bridge construction methods and
materials makes it difficult to find enough damaged bridges within a certain type to ob-
tain statistically significant results. Therefore, bridge types are grouped together, which
reduces the accuracy of the curves for individual bridges. Another cause of error oc-
curs because of the inconsistency of recorded ground motion levels: maps created by
USGS and Woodward-Clyde Federal Services (WCFS) show different shaking levels at
the same location (Basoz and Kiremidjian, 1997). Similarly, bridge damage levels var-
ied from inspector to inspector (Basoz and Kiremidjian, 1997). Finally, as previously
mentioned, empirical fragility curves can only be created after significant events. The
CEUS has not experienced enough large magnitude events to develop their own fragility
curves, and the different faulting patterns, bridge types, and soil conditions bring into
question the applicability of California-based empirical curves to bridges in the CEUS.
Analytical fragility functions are created when actual ground motion data and bridge
damage levels are unavailable or to supplement existing empirical data. Three primary
methods exist to find these functions: elastic spectral response, non-linear static analy-
sis, and non-linear time history analysis.
The first of these methods, elastic spectral response, is the easiest and quickest of
the approaches. Bridge component capacities are found using the Federal Highway
Administration’s (FHWA) Seismic Retrofitting Manual for Highway Bridges (FHWA,
1995b). Demand levels are determined by performing an elastic spectral analysis for the
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bridge. Then, the capacity-to-demand ratios are calculated, matched to certain damage
states for several different peak ground accelerations, and used to create fragility curves
(Jernigan and Hwang, 2002).
The second method, non-linear static analysis, offers better results than elastic spec-
tral response and does not take an unreasonable amount of time because time-history
analysis is not included. This is the method used by HAZUS to calculate its fragility
curves for standard bridges (Bosöz and Mander, 1999). The bridge capacity is cal-
culated by developing a non-linear static pushover curve. Demand is modeled by a
reduced response spectrum plotted as an acceleration-displacement response spectrum
which can be adjusted from an elastic to an inelastic response spectrum to better model
the structure’s behavior (Nielson, 2005). The intersection of the capacity and demand
curves provides the information required to create the fragility curves (Nielson, 2005).
The third and final method, non-linear time history analysis, is the most accurate
analytical approach, but it also is most computationally expensive. A suite of ground
motions is developed for the bridge’s region. Then, finite element models of the bridge
undergo numerical simulations using the suite of ground motions to generate bridge
component responses. This information is used to create a probabilistic seismic demand
model. Each component’s capacity is found using expert based, experimentally based,
and/or analytically based methods. The demand and capacity models are used to create
fragility curves (Nielson, 2005).
The following two sections explain options available to develop fragility curves for a
large set of bridges, such as ODOT’s inventory of bridges. Both of the options discussed
rely on analytical fragility curves.
1.3.2 HAZUS Fragility Curves
HAZUS (FEMA, 2003), a standardized methodology for estimating potential losses due











Figure 5-2: Illustration of Major Bridge Components.
5.2 Three Dimensional Analytical Models of Typical Bridges
In this section, analytical models of the nine considered bridge classes which are common
to the CSUS are developed and presented. The intent here is to present the analytical model
for a typical configuration for each bridge class and illustrate a typical seismic response for
each class. Nonlinearities are considered in material and bridge component behavior. Five
percent Rayleigh damping is used in these models. The damping coe cients are calculated
such that five percent damping occurs in the first two modes as calculated by the eigenvalue
analysis. Note five percent damping is used for the deterministic analyses presented in this
chapter. In later chapters the damping ratio is assumed to be a random variable.
The seismic response is illustrated using a single ground motion from the suite of Rix
ground motions (Rix and Fernandez-Leon, 2004). The selected ground motion has a mag-
nitude 7.5, an epicentral distance of 20 km and a duration of 25.1 seconds. The ground
76
Figure 1.5: Typical bridge components (Nielson, 2005).
extensive, and complete damage (Mander, 1999). The qualitative description of the four
damage states is given in Table 1.1 and the mentioned bridge components are shown in
Fig. 1.5. The fragility curves are based on a log-normal cumulative distribution function
(with a log standard deviation equal to 0.6) parametrized by the median 1.0-sec spectral
acceleration (S 1).
There are several metrics to measure ground motion intensity due to an earthquake.
Some of the most common include peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground ve-
locity (PGV), spectral acceleration at a period of 0.3-sec (S 0.3), spectral acceleration at
a period of 1.0-sec (S 1), and spectral acceleration at a period of 3.0-sec (S 3). HAZUS
uses S 1 because most damage states for bridges are most closely governed by the long
period case (Bos¨z and M nde , 1999).
For each of the 28 bridge classes described by HAZUS (HWB1–HWB28), a median
PGA value is given, which is converted to S 1 by a combination of the factors K3D, Kskew,
and Kshape to account for variations among the individual bridges due to the number of
spans of the bridge, the skew angle of the bridge, and the estimated period of the bridge,
respectively. The skew angle is the angle between the bridge’s supports and the line
perpendicular to its deck. In an unskewed bridge, the supports are perpendicular to the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.6: Illustration of bridge skew angle (Nielson, 2005).
The information needed from each bridge to complete these calculations includes
the year built, number of spans, skew angle, main span material, and maximum span
length, all of which can be found in the National Bridge Inventory (NBI) (USDOT,
2015). The HAZUS MR4 Technical Manual provides a full description of the calcula-
tions used to develop the fragility curves (FEMA, 2003). A condensed version of this
procedure is given in Appendix A. These same fragility curves are used by ShakeCast
(Wald et al., 2008) to create a priority ranking of bridges that need to be inspected after
an earthquake.
The calculated fragility curve is used to predict how the bridge will respond during
an earthquake. For instance, given an S 1 value, one can determine the probability of
a particular bridge being in each of the damage states. Fig. 1.7 shows sample fragility
curves for a bridge described in Mander (1999). If this bridge experiences an S 1 of 0.2g,
as shown on the x-axis, it has a 61% chance of being in the slight damage state, a 38%
chance of being in the moderate damage state, a 25% chance of being in the extensive
damage state, and a 10% chance of being in the complete damage state.
In the event of an earthquake, Caltrans uses the median (50%) S 1 for each of the
damage states to determine a list with the priority ranking of bridges to inspect. For
the example in Fig. 1.7, if the bridge experienced an S 1 between 0.10g and 0.24g, it
would be flagged green for low inspection priority. Between 0.24g and 0.30g would
be flagged yellow for medium priority, between 0.30g and 0.44g would be flagged or-
12
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Figure 1.7: Sample fragility curves for a bridge described in Mander (1999).
ange for medium-high priority, and above 0.44g would be flagged red for high priority.
Within each flagging color, bridges are prioritized by how close their level of shaking
is to the damage state. For instance, in the example given above, a bridge that experi-
ences 0.3g would have a higher inspection priority than a bridge that experiences 0.25g,
even though both were flagged yellow, because the 0.3g bridge is closer to the moderate
damage state. However, it is important to remember that this flagging system is not a
guarantee that bridges will be damaged because of an earthquake: it is only a means of
ranking the bridges most likely to be damaged and prioritizing post-earthquake inspec-
tions.
Because the HAZUS fragility curves are based on standard bridges, they cannot
take into consideration all of the details of an individual bridge. Therefore, the fragility
curves should be used as a guide rather than a definitive, deterministic representation
for all bridges. More rigorous analytical methods may be used to get a more accurate
representation of a bridge, or component based fragility curves may be utilized.
13
1.3.3 Component Based Fragility Curves
ShakeCast v2 used HAZUS fragility curves as its default for bridge fragility curves be-
cause it required little effort or additional information to calculate the fragility curves.
ShakeCast v3 offers the option for additional accuracy of using component-based
fragility curves (Lin et al., 2015). These are more accurate, but require additional
data about the system’s bridges which must be obtained through modeling. California
is currently developing these fragility curves for their bridges; however, because of
different soil conditions and bridge construction standards, we do not believe they can
be directly transferred to other parts of the country.
Nielson (2005) researched creating component-based fragility curves for the central
and southeastern United States. He examined the region’s bridge inventory using the
NBI database, and found the most common types of bridges in this region, listed in
Table 1.2. These types are subdivisions of the HAZUS bridge classes, which should
allow for more accurate results for individual bridges.
Similar to HAZUS, Nielson (2005) examined the year built, the number of spans,
the maximum span length, the total length, the skew angle, and the structure type, but he
also included information about deck width, vertical underclearance, deck condition rat-
Table 1.2: Bridge types examined by Nielson (2005) and their HAZUS classes.
Bridge Type HAZUS Class
Multi-Span Continuous Concrete Girder HWB10, HWB22
Multi-Span Continuous Slab HWB10, HWB22
Multi-Span Continuous Steel Girder HWB15, HWB26
Multi-Span Simply Supported Concrete Girder HWB5, HWB17
Multi-Span Simply Supported Concrete Box Girder HWB5, HWB17
Multi-Span Simply Supported Slab HWB5, HWB17
Multi-Span Simply Supported Steel Girder HWB12, HWB24
Single-Span Concrete Girder HWB3
Single-Span Steel Girder HWB3
14
ing, superstructure condition rating, and substructure condition rating. Although a large
skew angle can significantly reduce the median of fragility curves (i.e. making damage
more probable), Nielson (2005) did not model bridges with skew angles because most
of the bridges in the area examined had small skew angles.
After examining the various bridges, Nielson (2005) created models of each of these
bridges in the finite element software OpenSees (McKenna and Feneves, 2000) and
chose a suite of ground motions to represent the seismic activity in the region. These
ground motions were used to test the bridge models. He also examined the effect of
different parameters on the bridge fragility. Nielson (2005) chose to use PGA instead
of S 1 as the ground motion intensity measure for his study because he found it to be the
most efficient of the measures for use with bridges and the least sensitive to fluctuations
in behavior. The medians for fragility curves that Nielson (2005) found were different
from the HAZUS medians, some values greater and some smaller. Most significantly,
the slight damage states for the multi-span continuous bridges were smaller than the
HAZUS values. This is important because the slight damage state marks the point after
which bridges should be inspected, and Nielson found that bridges need to be inspected
at lower levels of shaking than HAZUS prescribes.
Yang et al. (2015) conducted non-linear time history analyses to explore the effects
of skew angle on bridges in the central southeastern United States. He concluded that
larger skew angles do indeed make bridges more fragile and developed formulas for
these relationships (Yang et al., 2015).
1.4 Summary
Most of the in-depth bridge analyses to date have been based on California bridges.
Due to different construction methods and soil conditions, it is important to increase the
amount of research for the CEUS. In Chapter 2, smart radii, an improvement on former
15
ODOT inspection radii, will be developed. In Chapter 3, existing attenuation models
will be compared to actual Oklahoma ground motions. In Chapter 4, a case study will
be performed on the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River to validate HAZUS fragility
curves. In Chapter 5, work on ground motions and fragility curves from the previ-
ous chapters will be combined to create ShakeCast-OK, which will be used as part of
ODOT’s post-earthquake bridge inspection protocol. The final chapter will summarize
conclusions and propose future work.
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Chapter 2
Post-Earthquake Smart Bridge Inspection
Radii
2.1 Overview
To revise ODOT’s inspection radii, both the capacity of and demand on Oklahoma
bridges were considered. Bridge capacity was modeled with HAZUS fragility curves.
The seismic demand was quantified by ground-motion intensity, which was predicted
using a ground-motion attenuation model adjusted for soil amplification and calibrated
with measured acceleration records from seismic stations in Oklahoma. The analysis
found that bridge inspections were not necessary for earthquakes with a magnitude less
than 4.6 (10% probability of slight damage), and ODOT’s inspection radii implemented
on 23 January 2015 (see Section 1.2.2) could be reduced.
2.2 Trigger S1 Value for Determining Inspection Radii
In order to determine inspection radii, a trigger S 1 value, below which damage is un-
likely to be found, must first be determined. However, the fragility curve for the lowest
damage state (slight) cannot be calculated a priori because it requires knowledge of the
spectral acceleration at 1.0 s and 0.3 s. Because of this, Caltrans uses a trigger S 1 value
of 0.10g instead of a fragility curve for slight damage. This value comes from their
17















































Figure 2.1: Base fragility curve used for Oklahoma.
experience of not seeing damage on bridges that experience an S 1 less than 0.10g (L.
Turner, personal communication, 2015).
ODOT, however, has not had Caltrans’ experience to determine if an S 1 of 0.10g is
also valid in Oklahoma. Therefore, the median S 1 values for the slight damage state in
HAZUS were examined and compared for non-California and California bridges. There
were four instances where the same bridge had a different value for a non-CA bridge
versus a CA bridge: HWB5 and HWB6, HWB12 and HWB13, HWB17 and HWB18,
and HWB24 and HWB25. Each of these instances gave the CA bridge a median S 1
value of 0.30g and the non-CA bridge a median S 1 value of 0.25g (FEMA, 2003).
Using this information, a ratio between the two bridges was determined and applied to
the S 1 value of 0.10g from Caltrans to give an S 1 value of 0.0833g for Oklahoma.
To ensure a greater level of confidence, the value of 0.0833g for Oklahoma was used
as the median S 1 for a base fragility curve (Fig. 2.1). The trigger S 1 values for 10%,
25%, 33%, and 50% probability of being in the slight damage state, were found to be
0.0386g, 0.0556g, 0.0643g, and 0.0833g, respectively. This will allow ODOT to choose
the probability of being in the slight damage state that they feel most comfortable with.
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2.3 Ground-Motion Prediction Equation
Having determined the levels of shaking deemed necessary to inspect for bridge dam-
age, the next step was to find an attenuation model (or ground-motion prediction equa-
tion) that could predict at what distance from the epicenter these levels of shaking would
occur. Two attenuation models were examined: Campbell (2003) and Kaka and Atkin-
son (2005). Campbell (2003) was chosen over Kaka and Atkinson (2005) because the
latter gives vertical S 1 instead of horizontal S 1. Additionally, ShakeMap currently uses
the Campbell (2003) attenuation model for Oklahoma (USGS, 2011). Campbell (2003)
was developed for earthquakes with magnitude between 5.0 and 8.2 and is based on
ENA (Eastern North America) hard rock.
The Campbell (2003) ground-motion prediction equation is




r2rup + [c5 exp(c6Mw)]2 (2.2)
f (rrup) =

0 for rrup ≤ r1
c7(ln rrup − ln r1) for r1 < rrup ≤ r2
c7(ln rrup − ln r1)
+c8(ln rrup − ln r2) for rrup > r2
(2.3)
and S 1 is the geometric mean of the two horizontal components of spectral acceleration
at 1.0 s for Site Class B (hard rock) in g, Mw is the moment magnitude, rrup is the closest
distance to fault rupture (hypocentral distance) in km, r1 = 70 km, and r2 = 130 km.
The coefficients ci are given in Table 2.1. Fig. 2.2 shows a graph of the Campbell




































Figure 2.2: Campbell (2003) attenuation model for Magnitude 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0 events.
the epicenter of the earthquake and decreases as the distance increases.
Because Campbell (2003) models the ground motion for hard rock (Site Class B), a
site amplification factor was used to correct the model for Oklahoma soil. The average
shear-velocity down to 30 m (V30s ) is a standard metric used to classify site conditions.
A USGS custom V30s map of Oklahoma and the surrounding area (Fig. 2.3) showed that
only Site Class C and D are present in Oklahoma (USGS, 2010). To ensure the inspec-
tion radii were independent of the location of the earthquake, Site Class D (stiff soil)
was used to represent all of Oklahoma because it is more conservative than Site Class
C. Further, Site Class D is the default site class per the ASCE 7-10 building code where
Table 2.1: Campbell (2003) attenuation model coefficients ci for 1-sec spectral acceleration
(S 1) [Eq. (2.1)].
coefficient value coefficient value
c1 −0.6104 c6 0.503
c2 0.451 c7 1.067
c3 −0.2090 c8 −0.482
c4 −1.158 c9 −0.00255
c5 0.299 c10 0.000141
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Figure 2.3: Map of V30s for Oklahoma (USGS, 2010).
“the soil properties are not known in sufficient detail” (ASCE/SEI 7-10, 2010, 11.4.2).
The Site Class soil amplification factors can be found in NEHRP Recommended Seis-
mic Provisions (Building Seismic Safety Council, 2009). All of the S 1 values chosen
for the radii cutoffs are under 0.10g, so the following formula is used to calculate the S 1
values for the inspection radii:
S M1 = 2.4 × S 1 (2.4)
where S 1 is the spectral acceleration at 1.0 s for Site Class B and S M1 is the spectral
acceleration at 1.0 s adjusted for site class effects (Site Class D).
2.3.1 ShakeMap Bias Factor Calculation
Because Campbell (2003) is calibrated for use with earthquakes of magnitude 5.0 to
8.2, the model needed to be adjusted for the smaller earthquakes experienced in Okla-
homa. To accomplish this, ShakeMap uses a bias factor to adjust the magnitude of an
earthquake such that the magnitude of the earthquake plus the bias factor yields the best
fit to the station data. This best fit is found by minimizing the L1 norm using station
21





∣∣∣ ln(S (i)1 ) − ln(Ŝ (i)1 )∣∣∣ (2.5)
where n is the number of stations, S (i)1 is the spectral acceleration at 1.0 s for Site Class B
calculated using the measured acceleration time-history at the ith station and Ŝ (i)1 is the
spectral acceleration at 1.0 s for Site Class B predicted by Eq. (2.1) with the magnitude
bias adjustment.
ShakeMap calculates S 1 and a respective bias factor for Oklahoma earthquakes only
if the magnitude of the earthquake exceeds 4.8 (C. B. Worden, personal communication,
14 July 2015).* When the smart radii were developed (August 2015), Oklahoma and
the surrounding areas had experienced only two earthquakes with magnitude greater
than 4.8: the 5.6 magnitude earthquake in 2011 (Oklahoma) and the 4.9 magnitude
earthquake in 2014 (Kansas). A bias factor was not calculated for the former because
ShakeMap was not using the Campbell (2003) attenuation model in 2011.
2.3.2 Bias Factor Calibration
To predict S 1 for future earthquakes, bias factors calibrated to all earthquakes affecting
Oklahoma and the surrounding regions are required. An approach similar to that of
ShakeMap (Worden et al., 2010) was adopted to calibrate bias factors correlated to ac-
tual seismic station data in and around Oklahoma. Fitting the bias factor requires mea-
sured ground-motion acceleration time-histories from previous earthquakes. Ground-
motions from seismic stations were acquired for 41 earthquakes that had a magnitude
of at least 4.0 occurring between 27 February 2010 and 20 June 2015 (USGS, 2015b).
Fig. 2.4 shows a distribution of the earthquakes’ magnitudes, depths, and locations.
The acceleration time-histories were retrieved from Standing Order for Data (SOD)
*This threshold was subsequently reduced to M3.5 by USGS on 17 December 2015.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of earthquakes used to calibrate the bias factor: (a) depth versus mag-
nitude; (b) earthquake location (USGS, 2015b).
for the GS, US, OK, N4, AG, HQ, and TA seismic networks (Owens et al., 2004). For
stations with a ?N? channel code (acceleration), the earthquake data was retrieved and
processed according to a modified version of the waveform recipe provided by SOD to
generate a SAC file with the acceleration time-histories of each station. For stations with
a ?H? channel code (high gain seismometer measuring velocity), the earthquake data
was retrieved and processed similarly to the ?N? earthquake data and then differentiated
to generate a SAC file with the acceleration time-histories of each station. These SAC
files were written in Intel processor style little endian byte order.
The SAC files were converted to MAT files to be read in MATLAB (Liel, 2014).
Each MAT file included a matrix of times (s) and of accelerations (m/s2). A few of
the peak accelerations (PGA) retrieved from the SOD station data were spot-checked
against the PGA values from the respective stations and earthquakes provided by the
ShakeMap Archive. For the comparison, the PGA from SOD was converted to %g to be
consistent with ShakeMap. Although none of the data exactly matched the ShakeMap
station values, the values were generally very close. Another resource used to compare
our PGA values to the USGS PGA values was the Event Page link provided in the USGS
Preliminary Earthquake Report email. For the M4.0 event which occurred on 20 June
2015 at 5:10:54 UTC, there was an average percent error of 1.97% between the PGA
23











































Figure 2.5: Response spectrum (5% damped) for the HHE acceleration time-history (top-right)
provided by the OK.OKCFA seismic station for the magnitude 5.6 Oklahoma earthquake that
occurred on 6 November 2011. Spectral acceleration at 1.0 s (S 1) is identified.
values from SOD and USGS. The maximum percent error was 5.94% and the minimum
was 0.06%. Additionally, while most of the stations and channel codes provided by
SOD and USGS were the same, both SOD and USGS had some stations not presented
by the other and USGS had more channel codes than provided by SOD.
Response time-histories for a 5%-damped single-degree-of-freedom oscillator were
calculated in MATLAB via numerical simulation from which horizontal components
(i.e., ??E and ??N) of S 1 were identified for each station. Fig. 2.5 shows an example
response spectrum and how S 1 is identified. The S 1 values were matched with the
longitude and the latitude retrieved from SOD (Owens et al., 2004). For Oklahoma and
the surrounding area, ShakeMap generated S 1 values only for the M5.6 earthquake in
2011 and the M4.9 in 2014, so the calculated S 1 values could only be spot-checked
against the values from those earthquakes. Similar to the PGA values, the calculated
S 1 values matched closely with the ShakeMap Archive data although none of them
matched exactly.
While ShakeMap does not give the S 1 values for events of lower magnitudes, the
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map found through the Event Page link does have S 1 calculated for all of the stations.
For example, for the M4.0 event which occurred on 20 June 2015 at 5:10:54 UTC,
there was an average error of 5.58% between the S 1 values from SOD and USGS. The
maximum error was 15.71% and the minimum was 0.58%. These errors may be do to
differences in ground motion processing techniques.
A bias factor was calculated for each of the 41 earthquakes by using the stations’
longitude, latitude, and horizontal components of S 1 and the earthquake’s magnitude,
depth, and epicenter (longitude and latitude). For each station, the epicentral distance r
was calculated using the spherical law of cosines (Gellert et al., 1989), from which the
hypocentral distance rrup was calculated:
rrup =
√
r2 + d2 (2.6)
where d is the depth of the earthquake. Only stations within a 120 km radius of the earth-
quake were used to calibrate the bias factor. Finding the bias factor for each earthquake
that minimizes Eq. (2.5) requires a comparison between the measured and predicted
values of S 1. Recall that Campbell (2003) [Eq. (2.1)] predicts the geometric mean of
the horizontal components of S 1 for hard rock sites (Site Class B). To be consistent in
the comparison between the station data and the values predicted by Campbell (2003),
the geometric mean of the two horizontal components of S 1 was calculated from each
seismic station’s data, and the station S 1 values were converted from the mapped Site
Class (C or D, see Fig. 2.3) to Site Class B. The latter was done by dividing the S 1
value for each station by the station’s site amplification factor. The site amplification
factor is dependent on the magnitude of S 1. The relevant values from the NEHRP Site
Coefficient Table can be found in Table 2.2 (Building Seismic Safety Council, 2009). If
the station S 1 value falls between the given S 1 values, the site amplification factor was
linearly interpolated.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of calculated bias factors with mean and standard deviation indicated.
The proposed bias factor curve is also indicated.
Fig. 2.6 shows the calculated bias factors. Bias factors were retained only for events
with six or more seismic stations. Analyzing the bias factors for all of the earthquakes
with magnitudes between 4.0 and 5.6 gave a maximum of −0.05, a minimum of −1.17,
a mean of −0.5803, and a standard deviation of 0.2256. Conservatively, a bias factor
of −0.35 (approximately the mean plus one standard deviation) was chosen, instead of
the mean, to represent all Oklahoma earthquakes of magnitude 4.5 and below. There is
only one event with a magnitude of 5.0 or greater. This is not enough data to determine
an average bias factor from, so a bias factor of 0 was chosen for earthquakes with a
magnitude of 5.0 or greater. Between magnitudes 4.5 and 5.0 the bias factor is linearly
interpolated. A magnitude of 4.5 was chosen because most of the data is for magnitudes
below 4.5. The proposed bias factor curve is shown in Fig. 2.6.
Table 2.2: Site amplification factors.
Site Spectral Response Acceleration Parameter at 1-sec Period
Class S 1 ≤ 0.1 S 1 = 0.2 S 1 =0.3 S 1 =0.4 S 1 ≥ 0.5
C 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
D 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
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Fig. 2.7 shows all of the station data for magnitude 4.0 and 4.2 Oklahoma earth-
quakes compared to predictions using Campbell (2003) with no bias, with the mean
bias factor, and with the mean bias factor ± the standard deviation of the bias factors.
Note that for magnitude 4.0 and 4.2 Oklahoma earthquakes, the mean bias factor plus
one standard deviation is the proposed value. Fig. 2.7 also shows that even though we
fit the bias factors to individual events, the mean of the bias factor still does a good
job of fitting the data from all of the stations for a given magnitude. However, Fig. 2.7
also illustrates the considerable spread in the data. The biased model does not capture
this amount of spread, so this model both under- and over-predicts the extreme points.
ShakeMap, however, is better able to reflect this spread because it analyzes real-time
station data and uses these numbers in its S 1 calculations.
Fig. 2.8 shows station data for four earthquakes compared to predictions using
Campbell (2003) with no bias, with the bias factor producing the best fit, and with the
proposed bias factor. The unbiased Campbell model typically over-predicts the station
data, identifying a need for the model to be adjusted. In every case except Fig. 2.8(b),
the best fit bias factor appears to fit the data rather well. However, there are still data
points above the curve of the best fit bias factor in each case. When determining the bias
factor for inspection radii, we do not want to fit the data, but rather find an upper-bound
for the data. The proposed bias factor attempts to quantify this upper-bound. With the
exception of Fig. 2.8(b), the proposed bias factor does create the upper-bound for all
except one or fewer of the data points for each event.
The reason for the poor fit in Fig. 2.8(b) might be because the fitting of the model is
limited: changing the magnitude only moves the Campbell curve up and down. There
is no way to change the slope of the sections of the curve to create an even better fit for
this data. Creating an Oklahoma specific attenuation model would correct this problem;
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Figure 2.7: All station data for all earthquakes of magnitude (a) 4.0 and (b) 4.2 compared to
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Figure 2.8: Earthquake station data compared to Campbell (2003) with no bias, with the bias
factor producing the best fit, and with the proposed bias factor of (a) −0.35, (b) −0.35, (c) −0.14,
and (d) 0.
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Figure 2.9: (a) Proposed attenuation model for magnitudes 4.0, 4.5, 5.0, 5.5, and 6.0. (b) Se-
lection of inspection radius for magnitude 5.0.
2.4 Smart Inspection Radii
The spectral response accelerations predicted by the attenuation model presented in
the preceding section represent the geometric mean of the horizontal components of S 1,
not the maximum response in the horizontal plane. The spectral accelerations computed
from the biased Campbell (2003) model are scaled by a factor of 1.30 to increase the
motions to the maximum response (SD1) for the purpose of determining inspection radii
Fig. 2.9(a) shows the proposed attenuation relation for five magnitudes, assuming a
depth of 5 km when calculating rrup. This depth was selected because it is the average
depth of Oklahoma earthquakes (See Fig. 2.4). These curves were then used to find
an inspection radius for each magnitude based on the S 1 values selected from the base
fragility curve (Fig. 2.1). For each magnitude between 4.0 and 6.5 and for each critical
S 1 value (i.e., 0.0386g, 0.0556g, 0.0643g, and 0.0833g), the largest radius at which
the critical S 1 is expected to be exceeded was found. Fig. 2.9(b) gives an example
of this process: for an M5.0 earthquake, the proposed attenuation model shows that
the inspection radius for a 25% probability of being in the slight damage state (S D1 =
5.56%g) is 8.1 miles. To put the data in a format best suited for inspectors to use, the
radii were converted from km to miles. The resulting radii are presented in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Inspection radii based on Campbell (2003) calibrated with bias factor and adjusted
for site amplification.
Inspection Radii Based on P% Probability of Being
Magnitude in Slight Damage State (miles)
P = 10 P = 25 P = 33 P = 50
4.5 – – – –
4.6 1.2 – – –
4.7 3.6 1.0 – –
4.8 5.8 3.5 2.5 –
4.9 8.4 5.6 4.6 3.0
5.0 11.5 8.1 6.9 5.0
5.1 13.7 9.7 8.4 6.3
5.2 16.1 11.6 10.1 7.7
5.3 18.8 13.6 11.9 9.3
5.4 21.9 16.0 14.0 11.0
5.5 25.3 18.5 16.3 12.9
5.6 29.1 21.4 18.9 15.0
5.7 33.3 24.6 21.8 17.4
5.8 37.9 28.1 24.9 20.0
5.9 42.9 32.0 28.4 22.8
6.0 76.3 36.2 32.1 25.9
6.1 95.0 40.8 36.3 29.3
6.2 112.8 58.4 40.7 33.0
6.3 132.0 86.3 57.2 37.0
6.4 152.7 102.0 85.4 41.2
6.5 174.6 119.0 100.5 59.3
2.5 Prioritizing Bridges
ODOT provided data for 3773 bridges owned and maintained by the state on the ODOT-
designated highway system, referred to as “on-system” bridges, for which HAZUS
fragility curves were calculated.† This data was used to calculate fragility curves for
the bridges using HAZUS. The 25% probability of being in a moderate damage state,
calculated by HAZUS, was used to sort and prioritize the bridges. Approximately one
tenth of the on-system bridge inventory, 353 bridges, were tagged as priority. Of these,
†Note that “off-system” bridges (i.e., bridges owned and maintained by a county, city, or other local
or regional governmental unit, and not on the ODOT-designated highway system) were not included.
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32 were tagged as high priority, 109 were tagged as medium-high priority, and 212
were tagged as medium priority. The lists of these bridges can be found in Tables B.1,
B.2, and B.3, respectively, in Appendix B. All remaining bridges were classified as low
priority. Within the inspection radius, high priority bridges should be inspected first,
medium-high priority bridges inspected second, medium priority bridges third, and low
priority bridges last.
HAZUS is unable to calculate the fragility curves for 3 masonry bridges and 83
bridges tagged as “skew = 99 degrees” (variable skew). Therefore, masonry bridges
were tagged as high priority bridges, and variable skew bridges were placed in their own
category. Table B.4 lists the variable skew bridges. These bridges should be treated as
high priority bridges until more information is obtained.
This prioritization system for bridges does not take into consideration the actual
shaking a bridge undergoes in an earthquake. Shaking is greatest at the epicenter of
an earthquake and decreases with distance. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind
that a low priority bridge at the epicenter of the earthquake might be more at risk for
damage than a high priority bridge located at the edge of the inspection radius. The
prioritization provided here is preliminary and should be used until more sophisticated
systems such as ShakeCast can be implemented (Chapter 5).
2.6 Recommendations
By examining fragility curves for bridges, the ground-motion attenuation model, soil
amplification factors, and acceleration time-histories from seismic stations, the inspec-
tion radii presented in Table 2.3 were developed. These values were presented to ODOT
at the monthly seismic meeting on 28 July 2015. By using this table, ODOT is able to
choose what probability of being in a slight damage state they are comfortable with
and modify their post-earthquake inspection protocol accordingly. It was recommended
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that, as a starting point, ODOT use the 25% probability column and move to higher
probabilities if there is still no damage seen within those radii. Table 2.4 gives the rec-
ommended candidate grouping of these inspection radii. Within the inspection radius,
high priority bridges should be inspected first, medium-high priority bridges inspected
second, medium priority bridges third, and low priority bridges last.
Table 2.4: Smart radii groupings.
Inspection
Magnitude Range Radius (miles)
4.7 to 4.8 5
4.9 to 5.3 15
5.4 to 5.8 30
5.9 to 6.2 60
6.3 + 120
2.6.1 Expanding Inspection Radii
For a given event, the inspection radius should be expanded (1) to account for location
uncertainty and/or (2) if damage is found within five miles of the perimeter of the in-
spection area. There is inherently some uncertainty in the identification of the location
of the earthquake epicenter. This location uncertainty is included in the ENS (Earth-
quake Notification System) reports published by the USGS (Fig. 2.10). To account for
this uncertainty, the inspection radius should be expanded by the reported Horizontal
Location Uncertainty. Note that this value is reported in kilometers which will need
to be converted to miles for consistency. Additionally, the inspection radius should be
expanded by five miles if damage is found within the outer five miles of the original
inspection radius.
2.7 Summary
The smart inspection radii presented here incorporate both the demand on and capacity
of Oklahoma bridges. Demand is quantified by the ground-motion intensity, in this
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Figure 2.10: Example ENS (Earthquake Notification System) report. Location Uncertainty
indicated by the yellow box.
case spectral acceleration at a period of 1.0 s (S 1). Predictions of S 1 are made using
the Campbell (2003) ground-motion attenuation model calibrated with a bias factor
correlated to actual seismic station data in Oklahoma. These predictions are adjusted
by a site amplification factor (Site Class D). Inspection radii are set to be the largest
distance from the epicenter at which demand (S 1) exceeds capacity characterized by
fragility curves of bridges. A complete table of the calculated inspection radii was
presented (Table 2.3). The analysis showed that damage to bridges is unlikely (10%
probability of slight damage) for earthquakes with a magnitude less than 4.6.
The recommended post-earthquake bridge inspection radii (Table 2.4) are based on
a 25% probability of observing slight damage (S 1 = 0.0556g) and should be expanded
to account for epicenter location uncertainty. Based on these recommendations, ODOT
revised their protocol starting 1 April 2016. The press release (ODOT, 2016) is shown
in Figs. 2.11 and 2.12.
Additionally, priority bridges were identified from the Oklahoma on-system bridge
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ODOT firms up earthquake bridge inspection process 
The Oklahoma Department of Transportation is relieved by the results of a recent scientific
analysis showing it’s unlikely that a 4.6 or less magnitude earthquake will damage
transportation infrastructure in the state, including bridges. The department plans to
incorporate this new information into its bridge inspection protocol starting in April.
“This is great news for Oklahomans concerned with the long-term effects of increased
earthquakes in our state,” said Mike Patterson, ODOT executive director. “Our department
has aggressively inspected bridges and infrastructure for the past few years and learned a
great deal through this process about this relatively new phenomenon in our state.”
Infrastructure Engineers Inc., a team of consultants that worked closely with researchers
from the University of Oklahoma, validated ODOT’s inspection process. Additionally, the
year-long study of earthquake data revealed there is no structural damage occurring on
bridges after tremors below magnitude 4.7, indicating that bridge inspections are
unnecessary below this level. The department will continue to inspect bridges after
earthquakes, but starting at a threshold of 4.7 magnitude events.
The magnitude of an earthquake will determine how wide an area from the epicenter will be
inspected. Starting in April, crews will respond immediately to earthquakes at these new
levels:
4.7 to 4.8 magnitude — 5-mile inspection radius;
4.9 to 5.3 magnitude — 15-mile inspection radius;
5.4 to 5.8 magnitude — 30-mile inspection radius;
5.9 to 6.2 magnitude — 60-mile inspection radius; and
6.3-plus magnitude — 120-mile inspection radius.
ODOT previously checked bridges after almost every earthquake, then adjusting later to
inspect after every 3.0-magnitude event. After consulting national experts, including the
California Department of Transportation, the U.S. Geological Survey and Oklahoma
Geological Survey, that protocol changed in mid-2014 to inspections after every 4.0-
magnitude event within a 5-mile radius of the epicenter.
“We were conservative in our approach to bridge inspections, but now we have the science
to know with more certainty that 4.0- to 4.6-magnitude earthquakes present no danger to
transportation infrastructure in the state,” said Casey Shell, ODOT chief engineer. “This
change in protocol allows the department to better focus its resources.”
Shell said ODOT has never found any structural bridge damage in the state related to
earthquakes since inspections began in 2013. Oklahoma’s bridges meet federal design
standards, meaning they are meant to safely withstand some degree of vibrations and
movement.
Another component of the current $575,000 study was the creation of a post-earthquake
bridge inspection manual that describes best practices in detail as well as providing a step-
by-step inspection guide. This comprehensive document will be used by all ODOT bridge
inspectors statewide, and will be shared with other state agencies and government entities
such as the Oklahoma National Guard and with counties and municipalities. Additionally,
the study provided training to ODOT personnel that also will be shared with other agencies,
as well as detailed structural analysis on three bridges representing those typically used in
Oklahoma.
A second phase of the Infrastructure Engineers Inc. study is planned to begin next fiscal
year, which will create an analytical program combining ODOT bridge data and earthquake
data to help plan a localized inspection route. This will help inspectors respond even more
quickly and be more cost effective while ensuring safety for motorists.
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Figure 2.11: ODOT Press Release # 16-012: “ODOT firms up earthquake bridge inspection
process”.
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Figure 2.12: ODOT Press Release # 16-012: “ODOT firms up earthquake bridge inspection
process” (cont.).
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inventory by comparing the bridges’ median S 1 values for moderate damage. A total
of 353 bridges were tagged as priority: 32 high priority, 109 medium-high priority,
and 212 medium priority (See Appendix B). Within the inspection radius, high priority
bridges should be inspected first, medium-high priority bridges second, medium priority
bridges third, and non-priority bridges last.
This chapter serves as a starting point for revising ODOT’s Post Earthquake Bridge
Inspection protocol; however, more in depth analysis is still needed. Chapter 3 will
further assess ground motion prediction equations used for Oklahoma. Chapter 4 will






The effect of earthquakes on bridges is strongly linked to the intensity of the ground
motion at the bridge site. The intensity of the ground shaking is a function of the mag-
nitude of the earthquake and the distance from the epicenter to the site. The intensity
of the ground shaking as a function of magnitude, distance, and other parameters is
modeled with ground motion prediction equations, or attenuation models. In Chapter 2,
the Campbell attenuation model was compared to Oklahoma ground motions and was
shown to generally over predict ground motion intensity. This chapter will examine
the eight attenuation models used to represent Oklahoma ground motions for the 2008
USGS seismic hazard map (Peterson et al., 2008). Predictions made with these models
will be compared to measured ground motion intensities to assess their accuracy and
appropriateness for Oklahoma. Additionally, response spectra will be calculated for
seismic station data from the M5.8 earthquake near Pawnee, Oklahoma on 3 Septem-
ber 2016. These response spectra will be compared to the AASHTO design spectra for
the station sites. Finally, the trigger value, found to replace the slight fragility curve,
from Chapter 2 will be compared to slight fragility curves calculated for past Oklahoma
earthquakes.
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3.2 Evaluation of Current Attenuation Models
Ground motion attenuation models predict the levels of shaking from an earthquake
based on the earthquake’s magnitude and the distance from the epicenter of the earth-
quake. The attenuation models currently used to predict ground motions in Oklahoma
are presented below.
3.2.1 2008 USGS Seismic Hazard Map
The 2008 USGS seismic hazard map groups Oklahoma with the New Madrid seismic
zone (Peterson et al., 2008). This zone uses a weighted attenuation model that is a com-
bination of seven different attenuation models (Table 3.1). The weights are based on the
different types of models. Frankel et al. (1996) and Toro et al. (1997) are single-corner
finite fault models (0.3), Silva et al. (2002) is a single-corner point-source model (0.1),
Atkinson and Boore (2006) is a dynamic-corner frequency source model (0.2), Camp-
bell (2003) and Tavakoli and Pezeshk (2005) are hybrid models (0.2), and Somerville
et al. (2001) is an extended-source model (0.2) (Peterson et al., 2008).
Table 3.1: Central and Eastern United States ground motion models and weights (Peterson
et al., 2008).
2008 Ground Motion Prediction Equation Weight
Frankel et al. (1996) 0.1
Toro et al. (1997) 0.2
Silva et al. (2002) 0.1
Atkinson and Boore (2006)
140 bar stress drop 0.1
200 bar stress drop 0.1
Campbell (2003) 0.1
Tavakoli and Pezeshk (2005) 0.1
Somerville et al. (2001) 0.2
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3.2.2 Oklahoma Station Data
Acceleration time-histories from seismic stations were acquired for 80 earthquakes that
had a magnitude of at least 4.0 occurring between 27 February 2010 and 21 March 2017
using Standing Order for Data (SOD) (Owens et al., 2004). A list of these earthquakes
is presented in Tables 3.2–3.5. Both velocity and acceleration sensor data was collected,
but if a station had both sets of data, only the acceleration senors were used so the sta-
tion would not be double counted. Stations with only one direction of data recorded
were not included. Additionally, each acceleration time-history was screened for ob-
vious problems such as clipping, missing data, noise spikes, etc. which were removed
from this study. This resulted in 43 sets out of the 1329 sets of station data collected
being discarded. The remaining 1286 bidirectional ground motions records were used
to calculate the spectral response accelerations for each ground motion. In particular,
the spectral accelerations reported are the geometric mean of the two horizontal compo-
nents. Of interest to this work are the 1-sec and 0.3-sec spectral accelerations (S 1 and
S 0.3, respectively), which are reported in the following section.
3.2.3 Comparison
The calculated S 1 for each station were compiled and compared to predictions made
with the attenuation models. Figs. 3.1–3.3 compare the station data to the eight at-
tenuation models and the weighted model from the 2008 USGS Seismic Hazard Map.
For the weighted model, the Frankel et al. (1996) tables do not calculate values for
S 1 at epicentral distances less than 9 km or for magnitudes less than 4.4. Therefore,
the weighted model was adjusted to not include Frankel for these situations*. This is
why the weighted model line in the graphs for M4.4 and greater exhibit a very slight
discontinuity at an epicentral distance of 9 km. The figures show that most of the atten-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Station Data (Rock) for M4.5 Earthquakes(f)
Figure 3.1: Station data compared to the eight attenuation models and the weighted model from








































































































































































Station Data (Rock) for M5.7 Earthquakes(f)
Figure 3.2: Station data compared to the eight attenuation models and the weighted model from






































Figure 3.3: Station data compared to the eight attenuation models and the weighted model from
the 2008 USGS Seismic Hazard Map (cont.).
uation models tend to over predict Oklahoma ground motions. Epicentral distance was
used instead of hypocentral distance because epicentral distance is extracted from SOD
and almost half of the models use epicentral rather than hypocentral distances. For the
models that use hypocentral distances, a depth of 5 km was assumed.
Table 3.6 shows the root-mean-square error (RMSE) in comparing the station data













where n is the number of stations considered, and Ŝ i1 and S
(i)
1 are the ith predicted and
measured 1-sec spectral accelerations, respectively.
Because of Frankel’s previously mentioned limitations, Frankel cannot be compared
to all of the station data, so the incomparable points were omitted when computing
RMSE. The RMSE values as well as the graphs show that Atkinson 140 and Atkinson



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Seismic stations and their proximity to the M5.8 Pawnee earthquake epicenter.
3.3 Response Spectrum Comparisons
The largest earthquake Oklahoma has experienced to date (24 April 2017) was the M5.8
Pawnee earthquake on 3 September 2016. This earthquake had a depth of 5.6 km and
occurred at a latitude and longitude of 36.4251◦ and −96.9291◦. Response spectra were
calculated from station data for this earthquake and compared to the AASHTO design
spectra at the station locations.
3.3.1 Seismic Stations
Ground motion records were were retrieved from SOD (Owens et al., 2004) for all sta-
tions in the GS, NQ, and OK seismic networks within 120 km of the M5.8 Pawnee
earthquake epicenter. A total of 28 stations were identified. Fig. 3.4 shows the identi-
fied stations and their location relative to the earthquake epicenter. Table 3.7 presents
a list of these stations, their locations and soil conditions (V30s ), as well as which chan-
nels are used. Bidirectional ground motions are considered, so both the East and North
components were retained, but the vertical components were not included. For stations
with a ?N? channel code (acceleration), the earthquake data was retrieved and processed
according to a modified version of the waveform recipe provided by SOD to generate
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a SAC file with the acceleration time-histories of each station. For stations with a ?H?
channel code (high gain seismometer measuring velocity), the earthquake data was re-
trieved and processed similarly to the ?N? earthquake data and then differentiated to
generate a SAC file with the acceleration time-histories of each station. These SAC
files were written in Intel processor style little endian byte order, which were subse-
quently converted to MAT files to be read in MATLAB (Liel, 2014). Note that one
Table 3.7: Seismic stations composing the ground-motion suite.
Epicentral V30s Channel
Station Distance (km) Latitude Longitude (m/s) East North
GS.KAN01 109.6 37.1534 −97.7590 245.1 HNE HNN
GS.KAN05 113.3 37.1087 −97.8723 254.0 HNE HNN
GS.KAN09 100.1 37.1361 −97.6183 263.4 HNE HNN
GS.KAN13 81.6 37.0129 −97.4778 216.0 HNE HNN
GS.KAN14 109.6 36.9568 −97.9630 234.1 HNE HNN
GS.KAN17 101.4 37.0441 −97.7647 236.5 HNE HNN
GS.KS20 105.3 37.2297 −97.5543 247.9 HN2 HN1
GS.KS21 115.9 37.2865 −97.6630 258.0 HN2 HN1
GS.OK005 88.7 35.6549 −97.1911 330.2 HNE HNN
GS.OK009 103.7 35.5813 −97.4229 319.0 HNE HNN
GS.OK011 106.6 35.4852 −96.6858 268.0 HNE HNN
GS.OK025 100.6 35.5811 −97.3379 278.5 HH2 HH1
GS.OK029 84.3 35.7966 −97.4549 342.2 HN2 HN1
GS.OK030 56.7 35.9278 −96.7838 317.4 HN2 HN1
GS.OK031 53.0 35.9531 −96.8391 287.2 HN2 HN1
GS.OK033 42.3 36.0444 −96.9382 311.9 HN2 HN1
GS.OK034 50.0 36.0102 −96.7132 273.7 HN2 HN1
NQ.KAN15 112.8 37.2998 −97.5727 240.4 HNE HNN
NQ.OK914 51.6 35.9708 −96.8048 273.6 HNE HNN
NQ.OK915 54.2 35.9535 −96.7726 329.7 HNE HNN
NQ.OK916 84.6 36.8073 −97.7477 204.3 HNE HNN
OK.BCOK 105.0 35.6567 −97.6093 264.8 HHE HHN
OK.BLOK 45.2 36.7606 −97.2150 243.4 HHE HHN
OK.CHOK 96.6 35.5611 −97.0613 285.6 HHE HHN
OK.CROK 94.9 36.5047 −97.9834 296.9 HHE HHN
OK.DEOK 75.4 35.8427 −96.4983 281.4 HHE HHN
OK.QUOK 34.5 36.1714 −96.7080 335.4 HHE HHN
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Figure 3.5: Spectral response acceleration S a measured at seismic stations compared to the
2009 AASHTO Specifications Design Response Spectra: (a) all 27 stations including design
spectra at three sites — lowest design S a (NQ.KAN15), highest design S a (OK.BCOK), and at
the M5.8 Pawnee earthquake epicenter; (b) station OK.BCOK; (c) station NQ.KAN15; and (d)
station GS.OK005.
station that was identified, OK.GORE, was omitted from this study because its data was
inconsistent and potentially corrupted.
3.3.2 Ground Motion Characteristics
Fig. 3.5(a) show the response spectra for the 27 seismic stations that registered the M5.8
Pawnee earthquake. The spectral acceleration reported is the largest radial acceleration:
S a(T ) = max
t
√
[a1(t; T )]2 + [a2(t; T )]2 (3.2)
where a1(t; T ) and a2(t; T ) are the 5%-damped acceleration responses in two orthogonal
horizontal directions, in this case East and North, for a structure with period T . This
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is an orientation-independent measure of the spectral acceleration, as opposed to the
geometric mean of the response spectra in the two directions (Boore et al., 2006). The
largest spectral accelerations are observed at periods between 0.05 and 0.3 seconds.
There is variation in the spectra at different sites because the stations were located at
varying distances from the epicenter (Table 3.7).
3.3.3 Comparison to AASHTO Design Standards
Fig. 3.5(a) shows the spectral acceleration from each station compared to the 2009
AASHTO Specifications Design Response Spectra (AASHTO, 2009). For the sake
of clarity, design spectra are shown for only three locations: the lowest design values
(NQ.KAN15), the highest design values (OK.BCOK), and at the epicenter of the M5.8
Pawnee event. Because the design curves are based on the hazard from the Meers fault
in Southwest Oklahoma, the design spectral accelerations are higher closer to the fault
(OK.BCOK) and lower farther from the fault (NQ.KAN15). However, as can be seen
from Fig. 3.5(a), this does not necessarily correspond to the intensity of the ground
motions from the M5.8 Pawnee earthquake.
Fig. 3.5(b) shows that the station OK.BCOK displays a spectral acceleration curve
far below its design curve, while in Fig. 3.5(c) the design curve and measured spectrum
more closely match, with the measured S a exceeding the design value at a period of
about 0.15 sec. Note that there are stations between NQ.KAN15 and OK.BCOK that are
closer to the epicenter but farther from the Meers fault than OK.BCOK; these stations
would have design curves between OK.BCOK and NQ.KAN15 with higher measured
spectra. One station of notes is GS.OK005 [Fig. 3.5(d)] whose spectrum displays longer
period content than the other stations. The peak S a is at a period of 0.43 sec, whereas
the other GMs had more energy in the 0.05 – 0.3 sec range. it is also noted that this GM
better matches the design spectrum than other GMs.
The mismatch between shaking levels and the design spectra at each location means
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that a bridge might experience shaking levels higher than it was designed for because
design spectra are based on the maximum creditable earthquake and do not take into
account induced seismicity. Also, the earthquakes Oklahoma is experiencing are not
near the Meers fault, where the design spectra are higher.
3.4 Computing Slight Fragility Curve
The slight fragility curve cannot be calculated prior to an earthquake because Kshape
requires actual ground motion data to calculate:
Kshape = 2.5S 1/S 0.3 (3.3)
However, using SOD and ShakeMap, S 1 and S 0.3 values from previous earthquakes can
be extracted to determine whether or not the proposed trigger value (Section 2.2) is
conservative. According to the HAZUS manual, the lowest unmodified median S 1 for
slight damage for bridges that include Kshape is 60%g (FEMA, 2003).
3.4.1 Using Station Data
Using the same set of data as in Section 3.2, the S 1/S 0.3 ratio was computed for each sta-
tion from each earthquake. These values were then plotted against the station distance
from the epicenter (Fig. 3.6(a)) and earthquake magnitude (Fig. 3.6(b)). Examining the
graphs shows that there is no correlation between magnitude or distance and S 1/S 0.3
ratio. Therefore, a single value rather than a function of magnitude or distance can
be selected to represent ratios for Oklahoma. Fig. 3.6(c) shows a histogram of all the
recorded ratios.
The 2.5 in Eq. (3.3) is the ratio between S 0.3 and S 1 for the standard code-based
spectral shape for which the HAZUS fragility curves were derived (Mander, 1999).
The fact that most of the S 1/S 0.3 ratios are less than 0.4 (1/2.5) shows that Oklahoma
earthquakes tend to have higher frequency content, which causes the bridges to be have
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Figure 3.6: S 1/S 0.3 ratios computed at each station plotted against (a) epicentral distance, (b)
earthquake magnitude, and (c) frequency of occurrence.
lower slight fragility curve medians (i.e. more vulnerable).
Knowing this distribution of S 1/S 0.3 (Fig. 3.6(c)), the probability of observing the
slight damage state given ground motion intensity S 1 can be calculated as follows:
P(slight | S 1) =
∫ ∞
0
P(slight | S 1, ρ) f (ρ) dρ (3.4)
where P(slight | S 1, ρ) is the slight fragility curve and f (ρ) is the distribution of the ratio
ρ = S 1/S 0.3. This integral can be calculated using Monte Carlo integration (Robert and
Casella, 2004). Eq. (3.4) can be approximated by the empirical average,





P(slight | S 1, ρ j) (3.5)
where ρ j ( j = 1, ...,N) are i.i.d. samples generated from the density f , taken to be
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.7: ShakeMaps for the M5.7 earthquake: (a) S 1 and (b) S 0.3 (USGS, 2015b).
the measured values (Fig. 3.6(c)). Evaluating Eq. (3.5) for the trigger S 1, 5.56%g, the
probability is determined to be 9%, which is below the 25% used in establishing the
trigger value (Chapter 2). For bridges that do not take into account Kshape, the lowest
base fragility curve for slight damage is 25%g (FEMA, 2003). This corresponds to a
0.6% probability of slight damage, which shows that bridges with Kshape are generally
more at risk than those without.
3.4.2 Using ShakeMap Grid
Because station data is usually so far from the epicenter of the earthquake that the
shaking levels would produce extremely low probabilities of damage, ShakeMap grid
S 1 and S 0.3 values (Fig. 3.7) were used to calculate probabilities of damage. The highest
probability of damage for the M5.7 and M5.8 earthquakes are 12% (Fig. 3.8(a)) and
4.8% (Fig. 3.8(b)), respectively. The probability of 12% seems unrealistically high,
seeing as the next highest probability of damage is 5.4% (Fig. 3.8(c)). Because these
percentages are lower than the 25% probability of damage that the trigger value is based

















































































Figure 3.8: Contours of probability of slight damage based on S 1/S 0.3 ratios from ShakeMap
for the (a) M5.7 earthquake, (b) M5.8 earthquake, and (c) M5.7 earthquake with outlier point
removed.
3.5 Summary
This chapter compared Oklahoma station data to the attenuation models found in the
2008 USGS seismic hazard map. Most of the attenuation models overpredicted Okla-
homa ground motions; however, the Atkinson and Boore (2006) model had the best fit.
Then, response spectra calculated from seismic stations from the M5.8 earthquake were
compared to the AASHTO spectra from those sites. Because the AASHTO spectra are
based off of the Meers fault, the measured levels of shaking sometimes exceeded the
design curves at locations farther from the fault. Finally, slight fragility curve values
were calculated for previous Oklahoma earthquakes. The computed values showed that
the trigger value that this research determined is conservative.
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Chapter 4
Seismic Analysis of the I-35/Cimarron River
Bridge
4.1 Overview
In Chapter 2, it was established that there are two components to determine inspection
radii: demand on a bridge and capacity of a bridge. Chapter 3 further examined demand
on a bridge. This chapter will further examine capacity of a bridge, using a seismic
response analysis for the Interstate 35 (I-35) bridge over the Cimarron River as a case
study.
The I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River (NBI 145170000000000 and 14518-
0000000000) is located approximately 40 miles north of Oklahoma City in Logan
County, Oklahoma (35.9860◦ N, −97.3530◦ W). The bridge’s median S 1 values for
moderate, extensive, and complete damage as determined by HAZUS are 0.48g, 0.67g,
and 0.87g, respectively. Fig. 4.1 shows a photo of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron
River.
The Oklahoma Department of Transportation selected the I-35 bridge over the
Cimarron River for this study because (a) it is a route critical bridge along the I-35
corridor and (b) it is a skew bridge. This chapter describes our seismic study and
provides conclusions to understand the seismic performance of this bridge and to help
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determine the level of effort involved in performing similar studies for other bridges.
The results from this study can also be used to verify and adjust the parameters used
in the HAZUS fragility curves that are critical in developing the Interim Response
Protocol (Chapter 2), as well as ShakeCast-OK (Chapter 5). The goals of this study are
as follows:
• Estimate the seismic fragility of the bridge per HAZUS fragility values (FEMA,
2003).
• Review available design plans of the bridge layout and develop analytical models
of bridge components from the plans.
• Construct a detailed non-linear finite element model of the bridge in OpenSees
(McKenna and Feneves, 2000), including superstructure components, substruc-
ture components, and bearings.
• Perform an eigenvalue analysis using OpenSees to extract the first 100 natural
periods and accompanying mode shapes.
Figure 4.1: Photo of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River.
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• Establish capacities of the concrete columns (flexural) and bearings (deformation)
incorporating survey data from bridge inspectors.
• Perform time-history simulations with the finite element model for five ground
motions matched to a 7% probability of exceedance in 75 years response spectrum
applied longitudinally and then transversely.
• Perform time-history simulations with the finite element model for five ground
motions matched to a 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years response spectrum
applied longitudinally and then transversely.
• Compare the results of the time-history simulations to the established capacities
to assess for damage and identify potential weak points in the structure.
4.2 Bridge Layout
Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 show the general elevation and plan of the I-35 bridge over the Cimar-
ron River. The I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River comprises a northbound bridge and
a southbound bridge, each comprised of eight spans consisting of two 101-ft spans, two
100-ft 9-in. spans, and four 100-ft spans for a total length of 803 ft 6 in. The eight spans
are divided into two continuous four-span segments. The width of each span is 42 ft
41/2 in. Each span is constructed of eight built up steel girders for end and center spans;
see Appendix C.1.
The girders for the north end spans bear on an abutment supported on piles at one
end and bents at the other end, and the girders for the south end spans bear on an abut-
ment supported on shallow spread footing foundation at one end and bents at the other
end. The girders in the center spans are supported at each end by reinforced concrete
bents. Note that the bridge underwent a widening in 1978, and the substructure consists

























































































































































this bridge consists of a T-shaped 5-ft 3-in. or 5-ft wide by 6-ft deep reinforced concrete
bent beam supported by three 60-in. diameter circular reinforced concrete columns; see
Appendix C.2. The columns range in above ground height of between 24 and 32 ft. The
end and intermediate supports are at a 30◦ angle with the longitudinal axis of the bridge;
the effects of skew on the response of bridges have been shown to be more significant
for skew angles greater than 20◦. The layout and configuration of the northbound bridge
and southbound bridge are the same.
Fixed high-type steel, expansion roller, and expansion-type elastomeric bearings are
used on this bridge. The high-type steel bearings, shown in Fig. 4.5(a), are used at the
second and sixth piers.* This bearing includes a sole plate and keeper plate to which the
girder is attached. The combination of a rocker plate, a web plate, and web stiffeners
form the bearing. Two anchor bolts attach the bearing to the bent.
The roller bearings, shown in Fig. 4.5(b), are used at both abutments and the first,
third, fifth, and seventh piers. This bearing is made of an extra strong pipe with a square
bar attached across the opening of each end of the pipe and connected to the opposite
*Refer to Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 for pier numbering.
Figure 4.4: Photo of bridge substructure.
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bar by a stiffener plate. The bar rests in a notch at each end of the bottom plate to keep
the pipe from rolling too far. A sole plate connects the girder to the bearing and two
anchor bolts connect the bottom plate to the pier.
Two elastomeric bearings, as shown in Fig. 4.5(c), are used at the fourth pier. The
end of each of the two girders rests on an elastomeric bearing pad. Two anchor bolts set
into the bent cap are inserted through a slot in the anchor plate. Appendix C.3 shows
the bearing details.
4.3 Analytical Models of Bridge Components
The analytical bridge model developed in this study has a reasonable degree of fidelity
and therefore requires a significant amount of detail in modeling the various bridge
components. These components are classified into one of three main categories: (i) su-
perstructure which consists of girders, deck slab, and parapets; (ii) substructure which
consists of abutments, bents (beams and columns), shear walls, footings, and founda-
tions (piles); and (iii) bearings whose primary responsibility is to tie the superstructure
to the substructure. The models of these bridge components were created in the analy-
sis software OpenSees, which was initiated and is maintained by the Pacific Earthquake
Engineering Research (PEER) Center (McKenna and Feneves, 2000). Fig. 4.6 depicts
the node layout for the entire I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River. Nearly 5000 nodes
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.5: Photos of bearings used in the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River: (a) fixed high-
type steel bearing; (b) roller bearing; (c) expansion elastomeric bearing.
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were used in the model to represent the bridge components.
4.3.1 Bridge Superstructure
The superstructure of the bridge refers to the portion of the bridge located above the
bearings. In general, this consists of a set of girders with a thin concrete deck cast on
top. The deck elements were modeled in OpenSees by using elastic shell elements and
the girder elements were modeled using 5-ft elastic beam elements. The superstructure
is expected to remain linearly elastic under seismic loading (cracking was not modeled
nor was the deck joint at pier 4).
The superstructure details for the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River are shown in
Fig. C.1 (Appendix C.1). Note that this bridge underwent a widening in 1978, and the
“Finished Bridge” in its present configuration is the one modeled here. The concrete
deck is 6.5 in. thick and has an assumed density of 150 pcf. The steel girders are
constructed of built-up plate sections. The properties are: cross sectional area ranging
Figure 4.6: Nodes in the finite element model of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River.
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between 43.75 and 69.75 in.2, moment of inertia of between 8,754 and 20,696 in.4,
density of 490 pcf and a distance from the bottom to neutral axis of girder between 15
and 19 in.
4.3.2 Bridge Substructure
The substructure of the bridge refers to the portion of the bridge located below the
bearings. In general, this consists of abutments, foundations, and bents (beams and
columns). The bents were modeled in detail for the finite element analysis of the bridge
structure, but soil-structure interactions were not modeled; i.e., fixed conditions were
assumed at the top of the drilled shafts and abutments. Additional modeling, including
rotational and translation springs to represent the soil (substructure method) or fully
coupling the structural model with a detailed finite element model of the soil (direct
method), could increase the fidelity of the model, but the inclusion of soil-structure
interaction is outside the scope of this work.
Multi-column Concrete Bents
Bridge piers (or bents) are substructure components which act as intermediate vertical
and horizontal supports for bridge decks. In this case, the bridge bent configuration
consists of multiple concrete columns which are supported on drilled shafts. The tops
of the columns are joined by a reinforced concrete bent beam (pier cap), used to provide
support for the bridge girders, and the columns are connected through their height with
shear walls. Fixed conditions were assumed at the bottom of the columns (i.e., at the
top of the drilled shaft / soil surface).
Fig. 4.7 depicts the node layout for the multi-column concrete bents. The finite
element model included nodes for the bent beam, columns, and shear wall, which were
connected by a combination of fiber elements and elastic shell elements, as described
below.
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Analytical Modeling of Concrete Bents The concrete bents were modeled in
OpenSees using a combination of displacement-based beam column elements (disp-
BeamColumn) and rigid links (rigidLink). The section properties for the columns and
the bent beams were created using fiber elements with appropriate constitutive models
for both the concrete and the steel reinforcement. Fiber elements allow the creation
of a composite section which consists of different materials located at various spacial
locations. Rigid links were used to connect the neutral axis of the bent to the top of the
bent, the columns, and the shear walls.
Material Models Reinforced concrete sections were constructed from three mate-
rials, namely unconfined concrete, confined concrete and reinforcing steel. The un-
confined concrete behavior was modeled using the Concrete01 material as provided in
OpenSees. This material uses the Kent-Scott-Park model (Scott et al., 1982) which uti-
lizes a degraded linear uploading/reloading stiffness and a residual stress. A concrete
peak compressive stress of 4.0 ksi occurs at an associated strain εo = 0.002.
The model for the confined concrete, which is inside the transverse shear reinforc-
ing steel cage, is slightly different from that of the unconfined (cover) concrete. This
Bent beam nodes          Column nodes          Shear wall nodes
Figure 4.7: Multi-column concrete bent nodes.
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is because the confinement of concrete by transverse shear reinforcement results in a
significant increase in both the strength and ductility of compressed concrete (Mander
et al., 1988). The maximum stress and associated strain for the confined concrete is
given as K f ′c and εo = 0.002K respectively, for which




where f ′c is the unconfined compressive cylinder strength, ρs is the ratio of volume of
steel hoops to volume of concrete core measured to the outside of the peripheral hoop,
and fyh is the yield strength of the steel hoops (Park et al., 1982).
For the columns, the transverse shear reinforcement is provided by #4, grade 60
stirrups spaced 12 in. on center. For a 60-in. diameter circular column with 4-in. cover,
ρs = 4.02× 10−3, which results in a K value of 1.060. Therefore, the confined compres-
sive strength and associated strain are equal to 4.24 ksi and 2.12 × 10−3, respectively.
The reinforcing steel is assumed to have a yield strength fys = 60 ksi and an elastic
modulus Es = 29,000 ksi, and is modeled as an uniaxial bilinear steel material object
with kinematic hardening (Steel01). A strain hardening ratio of 0.018 was used for this
material.
Analytical Model of Concrete Columns The elements for the columns were gen-
erated using displacement beam-column elements (dispBeamColumn) that have an as-
sociated fiber section being representative of the true column section. The bridge bents
use 60-in. diameter circular columns with vertical reinforcing bars. The vertical rein-
forcement consists of 16-#9 bars.
A moment-curvature analysis of the reinforced concrete section at the bottom of the
column was performed. Given the geometry of a column section and reinforcement,
the moment-curvature interaction diagram of a column section was determined. The


































Figure 4.8: Moment-curvature relationship for reinforced concrete columns.
the column; the axial force from dead load (202 kips) was used. The moment-curvature
relation of a column section is shown in Fig. 4.8. The moment My and curvature φy
at the first yielding — that is, when the vertical reinforcing bars reach the steel yield
strength for the first time — are indicated in the figure, as well as the ultimate capacity
Mu of a column section and corresponding curvature φu. Yield and ultimate moments
and curvatures for the columns are given in Table 4.1.
Analytical Model of Concrete Bent Beam The section for the concrete bent beam
is created in the same way as for the circular columns; i.e., displacement beam-column
elements with fiber sections. The bent beam has a T-shape (Fig. C.2): a combination
of two rectangular sections that are 36-in. wide by 54-in. tall and 63-in. wide by 18-in.
tall and employ 7-#11 (bottom steel), 7-#10 (top steel), and 6-#4 (side steel), grade 60
reinforcing bars with 2-in. cover. Non-symmetric behavior of the beam is present due
to the non-symmetric distribution of the reinforcing steel. It should be noted that this
beam section was assumed for the entire length of the bent beam.
Table 4.1: Moment-curvature values for reinforced concrete columns.
P (kip) My (kip-in.) φy (10−6 1/in.) Mu (kip-in.) φu (10−6 1/in.)
202 24800 52.5 34800 530
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Analytical Model of Concrete Shear Walls Between columns, there is a concrete
shear wall. The shear wall is 18 in. thick and is modeled using an elastic shell element,
similar to the bridge deck. For piers one and seven, the shear wall extends from the
bottom of the bent to 10 ft above the column bottom. For the other piers, the shear wall
extends from the bottom of the bent to 11 ft above the column bottom. The shear wall
is connected to the bent and columns using rigid links elements (rigidLink) found in
OpenSees.
4.3.3 Bridge Bearings
A bridge bearing is a mechanical system that permits movement or transfers loads from
the superstructure of the bridge to the substructure or support system of the bridge.
They are typically responsible for transmitting both vertical and horizontal loads to the
substructure. The forces applied to a bridge bearing mainly include superstructure self-
weight, traffic loads, wind loads and earthquake loads. They become a significant factor
in the overall response and functionality of a bridge before and after loading.
High-Type Steel Bearings
The high-type steel bearing is a fixed bearing. In both the longitudinal and transverse
directions, high-type steel bearings were modeled using a combination of the Steel01
and Hysteretic materials found in OpenSees. The bearings were modeled according
to Nielson (2005). The normal force on the bearings was found to be 59.7 kips. In
the longitudinal direction, the coefficient of friction (µ), initial stiffness, and hardening
ratio were taken to be 0.21, 491.7 kip/in., and 0.06, respectively (Nielson, 2005). In the
transverse direction the coefficient of friction, the initial stiffness, and hardening ratio
were taken to be 0.375, 1235.7 kip/in., and 0, respectively. Fig. 4.9 shows the analytical





















Figure 4.9: Longitudinal and transverse force-deflection responses for high-type fixed bearings.
Roller Bearings
The roller bearing is an expansion bearing. In both the longitudinal and transverse
directions, it was modeled using the Steel01 material found in OpenSees. The roller
bearing was modeled in the longitudinal direction according to Mazroi et al. (1982).
For the abutments, the normal force on the bearings due to the weight of the deck and
girders was found to be 29.8 kips which results in a µ of 0.006. For piers one, three,
five, and seven, the normal force on the bearings due to the weight of the deck and
girders was found to be 59.7 kips which results in a µ of 0.007. Zero was assumed for
the hardening ratio and 0.05 in. was assumed for the deflection used to find the initial
stiffness. Mazroi et al. (1982) did not model roller bearings in the transverse direction,
so the bearing was assumed to have the same transverse properties as the high-type steel
bearing, i.e., µ was taken as 0.375. The normal forces and deflection were taken to be
the same as in the longitudinal direction. Fig. 4.10 shows the analytical force-deflection
relationship for the roller bearings in both the longitudinal and transverse directions















































Figure 4.10: Longitudinal and transverse force-deflection responses for roller bearings located
at (a) North and South abutments, (b) piers 1, 3, 5 and 7.
Elastomeric Bearings
Elastomeric bridge bearings are a common bearing used on concrete girder and slab
type bridges. These types of bearings consist of an elastomeric rubber pad and anchor
bolts for restraint that are embedded into the pier cap and project through steel plates
attached to the underside of the girder. Each component of the bearing system provides
a distinct contribution in the transfer of forces. The elastomeric pad transfers horizontal
load by developing a frictional force while the anchor bolts provide resistance through
a beam type action. Models of the pad and the anchor bolts are developed separately
and then combined in parallel to get the appropriate composite action.
The bearing dimensions are presented in Fig. C.3. Each consists of a 60-durometer
elastomeric pad that is 71/2-in. wide by 15-in. long and 4-in. thick. It has two 11/4-in.
diameter anchor bolts (#11 bars) that are inserted into a slot that is 15/8 in. by 5 in.
Elastomeric Pad The behavior of the elastomeric pad is characterized initially by
shearing, while sliding controls at large deformations; the modeling of the elastomeric
pad was accomplished by using a Steel01 material in OpenSees. The Steel01 material
was used to construct a uniaxial bilinear steel material object with kinematic hardening
described by a non-linear evolution equation. The initial shear stiffness of the bearing
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and also the calculation of an appropriate coefficient of friction are fundamental values
that should be determined for modeling of the elastomeric pad. The initial stiffness, ko,





where A is the area of the elastomeric bearing, G is the shear modulus of the elastomeric
pad and hr is the thickness of the elastomeric pad. The elastomeric pads are 60 durom-
eter, for which the shear modulus G is in the range 130–200 psi, with an average value
of 165 psi.
The frictional coefficient for concrete bridges takes into account the interface be-
tween the elastomeric rubber and a concrete surface. Schrage (1981) showed that the
coefficient of friction for an elastomeric bearing is a function of the normal stress on the
bearing, σm, and is given by




where µ is the coefficient of friction and σm is the normal stress on the bearing given in
MPa. The normal force on each bearings was found to be 29.8 kips. The coefficients of
friction µ for the bearings are given in Table 4.2.
Anchor Bolts The anchor bolts are used to prevent excessive movement between the
girders and the piers, on which they bear. Each girder requires two anchor bolts at each
end. The anchor bolts are embedded into the top of the concrete pier cap and project out
and through anchor plates attached to the underside of the girder. Under working loads
the response of these anchor bolts is expected to remain linear. However, for moderate
Table 4.2: Elastomeric bearing pad properties.
Location A (in.2) hr (in.) ko (kip/in.) σm (psi) µ Fy (kip)
Pier 4 112.5 4 4.64 267 0.268 8.03
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earthquakes, a non-linear behavior is expected.
In work performed by Vintzeleou and Tassios (1987), it was shown that there is ex-
treme pinching in the hysteresis when a dowel is loaded as a cantilever, as is the case for
elastomeric-type bearings. There was also an obvious drop off in strength as the dowels
fractured. In order to construct in OpenSees a uniaxial bilinear hysteretic material object
with pinching of force and deformation, as well as, damage due to ductility and energy
dissipation, we estimated the yield and ultimate strength of a #11 anchor bolt acting in
cantilever action with 1-in. length. For a single bolt, the estimated yield and ultimate
strengths are approximately 34.2 and 34.5 kips, respectively. The yield deformation is
taken to be 0.05 in. and the deformation at failure is 0.10 in.
Analytical Model of Elastomeric Bearing The composite behavior of an elas-
tomeric bridge bearing is achieved by combining the behavior of the elastomeric pad
and two anchor bolts in parallel. The elastomeric pad is represented and modeled in
OpenSees by using a Steel01 material with an initial stiffness ko and yield force Fy
given in Table 4.2.
The anchor bolt behavior is modeled in OpenSees by using a hysteretic material
with yield strength of 34.2 kips. The 11/4-in. bolts are inserted into 15/8-in. by 5-in.
slots. The slot allows a total of 3⁄8 in. of transverse movement and 33⁄4 in. of longitudinal
movement without initiating the effects of the anchor bolts. This condition is simu-
lated by placing a 3⁄16-in. transverse gap and 17⁄8-in. longitudinal gap on each side of the
hysterisis; this gap is represented in OpenSees by using an elastic-perfectly plastic gap
material (ElasticPPGap). Fig. 4.11 shows the analytical force-deflection relationship






















Figure 4.11: Longitudinal and transverse force-deflection responses for elastomeric bearings.
4.4 Modal Properties
The modal properties of bridges are a useful way to classify their general characteristics.
An eigenvalue analysis of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River using OpenSees
extracted the first 100 natural periods and accompanying mode shapes. Fig. 4.12 shows
these periods.
























Figure 4.12: First 100 natural periods of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River.
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The analysis reveals that the bridge’s fundamental (1st) period is approximately 0.47
seconds with the predominant motion being in the longitudinal direction. This mode
shape is presented in Fig. 4.13 and confirms the longitudinal nature of this mode. Lon-
gitudinal motion occurs in spans 1–4, which correspond to the tallest columns. Motion
in all four spans is simultaneously activated because these spans represent a 4-span con-
tinuous deck segment. In addition to the deck moving in a rigid body mode, bending in
the columns is activated as well.
The 2nd mode is the first flexural mode (Fig. 4.14). Most of the modes of the bridge
demonstrate predominately flexural behavior. The 3rd mode is the first mode to show
rotation; however, this mode also demonstrates flexural behavior. The best examples of
rigid-body modes with rotation as the predominant motion are modes 23 and 25; Fig.
4.15 shows the 23rd mode shape. The 19th mode is one of the more interesting modes of
the bridge. It demonstrates bending in the columns of pier 4 (Fig. 4.16).
4.5 Seismic Response Analysis
As part of the seismic response analysis, transient time-history bridge responses were
calculated for ground-motion records that are representative of the seismic character-
istics of the site. A suite of five ground motions (GMs) at two hazard levels were
considered (i.e., a total of 10 GMs). The response of the columns and bearings were
recorded, and the results are presented. Maximum responses (column curvatures and
bearing deflections) are presented, from which conclusions on the state of the bridge are
drawn.
4.5.1 Ground Motions
Earthquake acceleration time histories previously determined by Liao et al. (2016) for
this site are used. Liao et al. (2016) performed a deaggregation analysis using the com-
puter program EZ-FRISK v7.62 in order to estimate the controlling earthquake magni-
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Figure 4.13: 1st mode of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River.
Figure 4.14: 2nd mode of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River.
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Figure 4.15: 23rd mode of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River.
Figure 4.16: 19th mode of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River.
76
tudes and distances for the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River as part of their Prob-
abilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA). The results indicated that the controlling
magnitude-distance pairs for this site range from M5.8 to M6.8 with associated dis-
tances ranging from 76 to 277 km.
Five earthquake acceleration time histories were selected based on spectral shape,
site conditions, moment magnitude, site distance, fault rupture mechanism, and duration
of strong shaking (Liao et al., 2016). The strong motion records were chosen from
the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research (PEER) Center database and are listed in
Table 4.3.
These GM time histories were spectra matched to target spectra for the site. These
target spectra were developed for 7% probability of exceedance (PE) in 75 years and
for 2% PE in 50 years. Liao et al. (2016) used these spectrally matched time histories
as the outcrop motions in the geotechnical site response analysis. The free field, site-
specific horizontal acceleration response spectra and corresponding time-histories for
the soil conditions at the site were developed using SHAKE2000. The site-specific
ground surface (free field) spectra resulting from the site response studies for 7% PE
in 75 years and 2% PE in 50 years are shown in Figs. 4.17 and 4.18, respectively. The
corresponding ground surface motions are shown in Appendix C.4. Notably, the 1.0-sec
spectral acceleration (S 1) for the two hazard levels are approximately 0.047g (7% PE
in 75 years) and 0.076g (2% PE in 50 years). These values bound the trigger S 1 value
used in the development of the smart bridge inspection radii (0.0556g), permitting an
assessment of that trigger value as a predictor for damage for the I-35 bridge over the
Cimarron River.
4.5.2 Damage States for Seismic Response Analysis
Past experiences have shown that the vulnerabilities of bridges during earthquakes are






















































































































































































































































































 294-TRC000 7% in 75 yrs
 4503-YLN 7% in 75 yrs
 4350-000 7% in 75 yrs
 4472-XTE 7% in 75 yrs
 4340-NZ1090 7% in 75 yrs
Figure 4.17: Response spectra (5% damped) for the five ground surface motions used in seismic
analysis — 7% PE in 75 years.
period (sec)



























 294-TRC000 2% in 50 yrs
 4503-YLN 2% in 50 yrs
 4350-000 2% in 50 yrs
 4472-XTE 2% in 50 yrs
 4340-NZ1090 2% in 50 yrs
Figure 4.18: Response spectra (5% damped) for the five ground surface motions used in seismic
analysis — 2% PE in 50 years.
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ple, large relative movements at the expansion joints may result in the loss of support
and excessive ductility demands on bridge piers may result in column failure in flexure.
Hence, estimating the capacity of bridge components is essential for determining the
risk of damage to structural components and the entire structure. With the definition
of qualitative damage (limit) states (Table 1.1), the next task is to assign a quantitative
measure to each of the limit states for each of the bridge components. Capacity limit
states for as-built components from Nielson (2005) are described in this section and will
be used when appropriate and modified otherwise.
Flexural Capacity of Concrete Columns
There are different metrics which are available for defining the limit states of the RC
columns, including drift, displacement ductility µ∆, and curvature ductility µφ. The





i.e., the maximum realized curvature divided by the yield curvature or curvature at yield
of the outer most steel reinforcing bar.
Nielson (2005) developed limit states using a Bayesian approach, whereby physics-
based (“prescriptive”) and survey-based (“descriptive”) information was combined. The
prescription approach used values adapted from Hwang et al. (2000). Hwang et al.
(2000) proposed limit states, in terms of displacement ductility, of 1.0, 1.2, 1.76, and
4.76 which correspond to yield, cracking, spalling, and reinforcement buckling†, re-
spectively. These limit states are defined in terms of displacement ductility, so Nielson
(2005) translated them into equivalent curvature ductilities for typical RC columns in
the Central and Southeastern United States, which are given in Table C.1 (Appendix
†The Seismic Retrofitting Manual for Highway Bridges (FHWA, 1995b) notes that, for poorly confined
columns, longitudinal steel will buckle at a displacement ductility of 3.0, which is thus the value chosen
by Nielson (2005).
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C.5). The descriptive approach used survey data from Padgett and DesRoches (2007)
where bridge inspectors and officials were asked to describe the functionality of a bridge
for different levels of component damage. Following a Bayesian updating procedure,
the limit states for the columns were modified, resulting in the limit states listed in Table
C.2. In this study, the prescriptive values for the column limit states are used, which are,
in general, slightly conservative and are given in Table 4.4.
Deformation Capacity of Bridge Bearings
Nielson (2005) used the same Bayesian approach to define the limit states for bearings.
The following presents the prescriptive limit states (Table C.1) and the Bayesian updated
limit states (Table C.2), as well as the limit states used in this study (Table 4.4).
High-Type Steel Bearings For the prescriptive limit state of high-type steel (fixed)
bearings, Nielson (2005) assumed a deformation of 0.24 in. for slight damage, 0.79 in.
for moderate damage, 1.57 in. for extensive damage, and 10.0 in. for complete damage
in both the longitudinal and transverse directions. These values correspond to appear-
ance of cracks in the concrete pier, prying of bearings and severe deformation in the
anchor bolts, complete fracture of bolts resulting in toppling or sliding of the bearings,
Table 4.4: Limit states for bridge components used in this study. Adapted from Nielson (2005).
Component Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
RC column (µφ) 1.00 1.58 3.22 6.84
High-Type Steel Bearing
longitudinal (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 7.35
transverse (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 7.35
Roller Bearing
longitudinal (in.) 1.47 4.10 5.36 7.35
transverse (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 7.35
Expansion-type Elastomeric
Bearing
longitudinal (in.) 1.92 4.10 5.36 7.35
transverse (in.) 0.24 3.58 5.60 7.68
81
and unseating of the girder resulting in the complete collapse of the span, respectively.
Following the Bayesian update procedure, the limit states for the high-type steel
bearings were modified. The median values for the updated limited states are presented
in Table C.2, which were used in this study (Table 4.4).
Roller Bearings Nielson (2005) did not consider roller bearings. However, the trans-
verse deformations for all damage states were assumed to be the values Nielson (2005)
used for the high-type steel bearings, to be consistent with the assumptions in Section
4.3.2. The longitudinal values for high-type steel rocker bearings and the values for
low-type steel sliding bearings were the same. These bearings are both types of steel
expansion bearings, so we assumed that roller bearings would have similar limit states
in the longitudinal direction.
Examining the plans for the roller bearing shows that the slot for the keeper bar and
the keeper bar may have a 2:12 slope. This would mean that if the bearing rolled ap-
proximately 18.4 degrees, the keeper bar would engage the side of the slot. Because the
roller is 63⁄8 in. in diameter, the deflection from this rotation would be about 2.02 in. This
is greater than the value presented in Table 4.4 for slight damage, so the assumptions
for deflections in the longitudinal direction for the roller seem valid.
Elastomeric Bearings The behavior of the elastomeric bearings is one which is con-
trolled by shearing, but at large deformations, sliding is initiated. Unrestricted sliding
can only occur once a fracture of the steel retention dowels (anchor bolts) occurs. For
the prescriptive information, Nielson (2005) assumed a deformation of 1.18 in. for slight
damage, 3.94 in. for moderate damage, 5.91 in. for extensive damage, and 10.0 in. for
complete damage. These values correspond to noticeable deformation without signifi-
cant closure, need for realignment with possible dowel fracture, need for some degree
of repair (girder retention) with assured dowel fracture and additional deck realignment,
and unseating of girder, respectively. These values were then updated using survey data
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(Table C.2).
The slot dimensions for the expansion elastomeric bearings detailed by Nielson
(2005) differ from those on the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River. On the I-35 bridge
over the Cimarron River, the slot allows for ±1.875 in. of deflection longitudinally and
±0.1875 in. of deflection transversely. According to the anchor bolt model, yielding and
failure of the bolt will occur, respectively, at 0.05 in. and 0.10 in. beyond engagement
of the slot. Therefore, the values for slight damage determined by Nielson (2005) have
been modified to be better representative of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River.
These limit state values are given in Table 4.4.
Note that Nielson (2005) considered dowels encased in the elastomeric pads, for
which “it is difficult, if not impossible, for a bridge inspector to recognize this fracture
or to differentiate between the fixed and expansion bearings.” Therefore, Nielson (2005)
assumed that the limit states for the fixed and expansion elastomeric bearings, in both
the longitudinal and transverse directions, are the same. This is not the case for the
bearings used on the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron River, as reflected in Table 4.4.
4.5.3 Seismic Evaluation of Bridge Components
Seismic Evaluation of Concrete Columns
Fig. 4.19 shows the maximum column curvatures due to longitudinal GMs. The vari-
ables φX and φZ are the transverse and the longitudinal curvatures of the pier columns,
respectively. The maximum curvatures occurs at the columns with fixed bearings (piers
2 and 6) and the lower curvatures occur at columns with expansion bearings (all other
piers). This is because, if the bearing does not readily deform (i.e., fixed-type), the
lateral inertial loads will be transmitted to the columns producing larger bending mo-
ments. The columns with elastomeric bearings show more curvature than the columns










































































294-TRC000 4503-YLN 4350-000 4472-XTE 4340-NZ1090
Figure 4.19: Maximum column curvatures for longitudinal GMs: (a) 7% PE in 75 years and
(b) 2% PE in 50 years. Marker shape indicates deflection direction; fill color indicates the GM
considered.
causes higher longitudinal curvatures in all piers. Similar trends are seen for the 7% PE
in 75 year GMs (Fig. 4.19(a)) and the 2% PE in 50 year GMs (Fig. 4.19(b)), but the 2%
PE in 50 year GMs produce larger curvatures.
Fig. 4.20 shows the maximum column curvatures due to transverse GMs. Piers 1
and 7 exhibit the largest curvatures.The other five piers (2 through 6) exhibit comparable
maximum curvatures. The figure shows that transverse loading causes more curvature
in the longitudinal than in the transverse direction in every pier except two and six.
This is because the bents are stiffer transversely than they are longitudinally. Note that










































































294-TRC000 4503-YLN 4350-000 4472-XTE 4340-NZ1090
Figure 4.20: Maximum column curvatures for transverse GMs (a) 7% PE in 75 years and (b)
2% PE in 50 years. Marker shape indicates deflection direction; fill color indicates the GM
considered.
trends are seen for the 7% PE in 75 year GMs (Fig. 4.20(a)) and the 2% PE in 50 year
GMs (Fig. 4.20(b)), but the 2% PE in 50 year GMs produce larger curvatures.
Figs. 4.19 and 4.20 show that the maximum column curvatures in the longitudinal
and transverse directions are 6.425 × 10−6 and 1.247 × 10−5 1/in., respectively. In both
cases, the curvatures are well below the yield values (5.25 × 10−5 1/in.). The max-
imum longitudinal curvature occurred due to longitudinal loading and the maximum
transverse curvature occurred due to longitudinal loading, as well.
Fig. 4.21 compares the moment-curvature plots for the column with the maximum









































(a) column curvature [10-6 1/in.]





































Figure 4.21: Moment-curvature responses for columns. (a) Pier 6, middle column for 4472-
XTE at 2% PE in 50 years in the transverse direction; (b) Pier 6, middle column for 4503-YLN
at 2% PE in 50 years in the longitudinal direction.
curvature relationship for the column’s capacity. The dynamic moment-curvature plots
for the columns follow the static moment-curvature relationship of the column very
closely. The curvature φy at the first yielding is also shown on the figure, and it can
be seen that the column curvature is well below its maximum curvature — a curvature
ductility (µφ) value of about 25%.
Seismic Evaluation of Bridge Bearings
Fig. 4.22 shows the maximum bearing deflections at each pier due to longitudinal GMs.
Each figure has points for five different earthquakes, eight bearings per pier, and two
directions of motion (longitudinal and transverse), or 80 points, with the exception of
the fourth pier which has sixteen bearings and 160 points. Maximum deflections are
lowest at the fixed-type bearings (piers 2 and 6), as expected. This figure is almost the
opposite of the curvature plots where the maximum curvatures occurred at the columns
with fixed bearings and the lower curvatures occurred at columns with expansion bear-
ings. Both of the abutments and piers one, three, five, and seven employ roller bearings.
The maximum deflections for roller bearings occur at the abutments because they are
















































































294-TRC000 4503-YLN 4350-000 4472-XTE 4340-NZ1090
Figure 4.22: Maximum bearing deflections for longitudinal GMs: (a) 7% PE in 75 years and
(b) 2% PE in 50 years. Marker shape indicates deflection direction; fill color indicates the GM
considered.
to but slightly less than deflections in the abutments. Similar trends are seen for the
7% PE in 75 year GMs (Fig. 4.22(a)) and the 2% PE in 50 year GMs (Fig. 4.22(b)),
but the 2% PE in 50 year GMs produce larger deflections. Also, it can be seen that
the longitudinal displacements tend to be greater than the transverse displacements for
longitudinal loadings.
Fig. 4.23 shows the maximum bearing deflections at each pier due to transverse
GMs. The points are for the same locations and motions as stated for Fig. 4.22. Like
Fig. 4.22, maximum deflections are lowest at the fixed-type bearings (piers 2 and 6).
However, the maximum deflection for rollers occurred at piers one and seven instead of
















































































294-TRC000 4503-YLN 4350-000 4472-XTE 4340-NZ1090
Figure 4.23: Maximum bearing deflections for transverse GMs (a) 7% PE in 75 years and (b)
2% PE in 50 years. Marker shape indicates deflection direction; fill color indicates the GM
considered.
greatest deflections. Similar trends are seen for the 7% PE in 75 year GMs (Fig. 4.23(a))
and the 2% PE in 50 year GMs (Fig. 4.23(b)), but the 2% PE in 50 year GMs produce
larger deflections. The shape, however, is different from that of Fig. 4.22. This may be
because of the skew angle.
Figs. 4.24–4.26 show force-deflection responses for the maximum deflections in the
transverse and longitudinal directions for the three bearing types: high-type steel, roller,
and elastomeric.
Fig. 4.24 shows that the maximum displacement in the longitudinal direction for
a high-type steel bearing is 0.02 in. and the maximum displacement in the transverse
direction is 0.05 in. Both of these values are significantly lower than the deflection for
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Figure 4.24: Force-deflection responses for high-type fixed bearing. (a) Pier 6, bearing #1 for
4472-XTE at 2% PE in 50 years applied in the transverse direction; (b) Pier 6, bearing #7 for
4350-000 at 2% PE in 50 years applied in the transverse direction.
slight damage presented in Table 4.4. These values are similar in magnitude because
the bearing is not designed to allow deflection in either the longitudinal or transverse
directions. Unlike the roller and elastomeric bearings, both of the maximum displace-
ments were caused by transverse loadings. These bearings experience larger deflections
because they carry larger loads. When we load the bridge transversely, the piers are
much stiffer and cannot accommodate the same levels of drift. Therefore, the inertial
loads transmitted to the bearings are greater.
The maximum displacement in the longitudinal direction for a roller bearing is
0.47 in. while the maximum displacement in the transverse direction is 0.14 in. (Fig.
4.25). Both of these values are lower than the deflection for slight damage presented in
Table 4.4. This makes sense because the roller is designed to deflect in the longitudinal
direction and is much more resistant to deflection in the transverse direction. Addition-
ally, the maximum longitudinal displacement is due to a longitudinal loading and the
maximum transverse displacement is due to a transverse loading.
Fig. 4.26 shows that the maximum displacement in the longitudinal direction for
an elastomeric bearing is 0.43 in. and the maximum displacement in the transverse
direction is 0.21 in. Both of these values are significantly lower than the deflection for
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Figure 4.25: Force-deflection responses for roller bearing. (a) South abutment, bearing #8
for 4503-YLN at 2% PE in 50 years applied in the longitudinal direction; (b) North abutment,
bearing #2 for 4350-000 at 2% PE in 50 years applied in the transverse direction.
deflection [in.]








































Figure 4.26: Force-deflection responses for elastomeric bearing. (a) Pier 6, bearing #1 for
4503-YLN at 2% PE in 50 years applied in the longitudinal direction; (b) Pier 4, bearing #7 for
4350-000 at 2% PE in 50 years applied in the transverse direction.
slight damage presented in Table 4.4. These values are more similar to one another
than the roller displacement values because the elastomeric pad allows displacement in
both the transverse and longitudinal directions. In the longitudinal direction, the force-
displacement response (Fig. 4.26(a)) is linear which indicates that the bolts were not
activated due to the displacement: all motion was in the bolt slot of the bearing. In
the transverse direction (Fig. 4.26(b)), the center portion of the figure shows motion
within the bolt slot; however, the gap is smaller transversely than in the longitudinal
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direction, so the bolt is activated and the stiffness increases which cause a stiffening
effect beyond about 0.20 in. of transverse deflection. Similar to the roller bearings,
the maximum longitudinal displacement is caused by a longitudinal loading and the
maximum transverse displacement is caused by a transverse loading.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, an OpenSees finite element model of the I-35 bridge over the Cimarron
River, located approximately 40 miles north of Oklahoma City in Logan County, Ok-
lahoma, was developed and used to conduct a seismic response analysis. The seismic
response analysis has shown that the potential for structural damage is low under both
the 7% PE in 75 years and 2% PE in 50 years level events considered. The analysis
indicates that the maximum curvature in the columns was about 25% of the yield curva-
ture and the maximum deflections in the bearings were less than 0.5 in. The maximum
column curvatures and the bearing deflections were below the values prescribed for the
slight damage state in the bridge fragility curves. This helps verify the HAZUS fragility
curves used for the development of ShakeCast–OK (Chapter 5). The maximum 1.0-
sec spectral acceleration (S 1) used in these seismic analyses, 0.076g, is higher than the
trigger value of 0.0556g used in the development of the smart bridge inspection radii
(Chapter 2). Therefore, the value of 0.0556g can be considered a conservative value for





Chapter 2 described the creation of smart radii for ODOT. This chapter takes the trigger
value established for the development of the smart radii and uses it as a starting point
for ShakeCast-OK, a further refinement of the inspection protocol. ShakeCast (short
for ShakeMap Broadcast) is a situational awareness application that automatically re-
trieves a ShakeMap from USGS, compares shaking intensities against users’ facilities’
fragility curves, and sends email notifications of potential damage levels to responsible
parties (Wald et al., 2008). ShakeCast has the benefit of using real time data to offer
better ground motion estimates than using an attenuation model alone. This will help
overcome the limitations of current attenuation models demonstrated in Chapter 3.
This chapter details the development and implementation of ShakeCast for ODOT,
termed ShakeCast-OK. To create a ShakeCast instance, the recommended practices
found in the Cloud Installation Guide were followed (USGS, 2015a). Then, modifica-
tions of the standard fragility curves were made to better match Oklahoma’s inventory,
and these modified fragilities were used to populate the instance. Finally, the savings
afforded by ShakeCast in terms of department of transportation resources are quanti-
fied through a few scenarios, in which ShakeCast is compared with the previous ODOT
inspection radii and the smart radii.
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5.2 Fragility Curve Modifications
When calculating the fragility curves for ODOT’s bridges, the standard HAZUS
fragility curves were not appropriate in all cases. As previously mentioned in Chapter
2, the slight fragility curve cannot be calculated prior to an earthquake. Because
ShakeCast bridge inventories are uploaded prior to an earthquake, a trigger value
is used instead. The same trigger value as previously described in Chapter 2 (i.e.,
a spectral acceleration at 1.0 second of 0.0556g) was used for every bridge in the
inventory.
Another concern with the standard HAZUS fragility curves was that they do not take
into account a bridge’s actual condition at the present time. To account for this and be
more conservative, two additional bridge properties were examined: (i) whether or not
a bridge was fracture critical and (ii) whether or not a bridge’s super- and substructure
were structurally deficient. The former is indicative of a bridge having at least one
tension member whose failure will most likely cause a part of or the entire bridge to
collapse and is identified by NBI item number 92A (FHWA, 1995a). The latter are
identified by NBI item numbers 59 and 60, and for this study an NBI rating of four
or less in either category was deemed structurally deficient. For fracture critical and
structurally deficient bridges, the moderate, extensive, and complete fragility curves’
medians were reduced to the S 1 value corresponding to a 25% probability of damage
from the HAZUS fragility curve. The purpose of this was to reduce the threshold values
for these damage states so the threshold would be exceeded for lower levels of shaking.
There are certain bridge classes that are not represented in HAZUS, e.g. masonry
bridges and bridges with a variable skew angle. Therefore, to be conservative, the
moderate, extensive, and complete fragility curves for these bridges were assigned to
be the lowest fragility curves found in the ODOT database: median S 1 values of 15, 20,
and 25%g, respectively.
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5.3 Populating the ShakeCast Database
In order to use a ShakeCast instance, files must be uploaded with information about
bridges and who should receive notifications about these bridges. Additionally, the
order which the files are uploaded to ShakeCast is critical since notifications will not be
sent if they are uploaded in the incorrect order.
5.3.1 Facility Inventory
Bridge information is uploaded to ShakeCast by using a CSV file. This file contains
several different fields of information including identifiers, descriptions, and fragility
values. The following facility fields were populated.
external facility id This field identifies the facility, which was determined to include
each bridge’s structure number (ODOT’s name to identify a bridge) and the first five
digits of its NBI number, e.g., ‘4230 1874EX / 14517’. The bridge’s structure number
was included because it is ODOT’s preferred way of identifying its bridges because it
provides information about the location of the bridge. The NBI number was provided
as an additional way to identify the bridge.
facility type This field identifies the type of facility. ShakeCast’s default facility type
for bridges is BRIDGE S T . However, using this for all of ODOT’s bridges did not
achieve the desired result. ODOT desired the notifications to be packaged by division so
that the division engineers would not have to sort through a list of bridges to determine if
their division was affected. Instead, new facility types, DIV1, DIV2, etc., were created
for each of ODOT’s divisions. By creating a facility type for each division, this will
allow the engineers to easily determine the number of bridges affected per division.
facility name This field was used to give additional identification information con-
cerning each bridge. This field was populated with both the facility carried (NBI item
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number 7) and the feature intersected (NBI item number 6), e.g., ‘I-35 / CIMARRON
RIVER’.
description This field is used to give a short description of the bridge. It is not
included in the email notification or the ShakeCast Summary Report. The additional
information included here was the bridge’s division, “Fracture Critical” for fracture crit-
ical bridges, “Structurally Deficient” for structurally deficient bridges, and the bridge’s
skew angle. This information was included so that inspectors would know factors for
each bridge that might cause it to need to be prioritized.
lat, lon These fields specify the bridge’s latitude and longitude.
METRIC:PSA10:damage-level Each field beginning with METRIC: is the facility
fragility specifier. The ShakeMap metric used is PSA10 (1.0-sec spectral acceleration),
and the damage-level is taken to be GREEN, YELLOW, ORANGE, and RED for the low,
medium, medium-high, and high potential impact fragility values, respectively.
short name This field is supposed to be a shorter version of the facility name used
in the output, but the default templates used this field as the ‘Location’ in the email
notification. Therefore, this field was populated with the latitude and longitude of the
bridge (e.g., ‘35.9847, 97.353’).
The first file that must be uploaded to ShakeCast is an XML file generated by the
ShakeCast Workbook (Q.-W. Lin, personal communication, October 2016) that defines
the facility types. This is required because new facility types (e.g., DIV1, DIV2, etc.)
needed to be created in the system. Additionally, icons for each division and for their
five possible damage states (none, slight, moderate, extensive, and complete) must be
uploaded so that bridge icons will show on the ShakeCast reports and online. After
uploading the facility types, the bridge CSV file can be uploaded.
Once the bridges have been uploaded, they can be viewed under the Facilities tab,
as shown in Fig. 5.1. Clicking on one of the bridges shown on this page displays infor-
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Figure 5.1: A screenshot from ShakeCast showing uploaded facilities.
mation about the bridge as well as its location (Fig. 5.2).
5.3.2 User Groups
After uploading the bridges, an XML file defining the groups is uploaded. The XML
file is generated by the ShakeCast Workbook (Q.-W. Lin, personal communication, Oc-
tober 2016). For this project, eight groups were created, DIV1, DIV2, DIV3, etc. A
group defines which facility types a person assigned to the group will receive notifi-
cations for. In this case, each ODOT division has its own group. The group file also
includes a predetermined area inside of which earthquakes will be processed. The area
for all divisions was defined as a polygon fully encompassing Oklahoma as well as por-
tions of the surrounding states. The administrator can set the minimum magnitude that
notifications will be sent out for. A magnitude of 4.0 was chosen. This file also lets the
administrator choose which notifications will be sent out. For this instance, notifications
were selected for each of the damage states. This means that a notification will be sent
out when there is a new event if any bridges have shaking above the trigger value.
Once the groups have been uploaded, they can be viewed under the Users tab.
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Figure 5.2: A screenshot from ShakeCast showing bridge information.
Fig. 5.3 is a screenshot showing the groups as well as the polygon used for all divi-
sions. Tabs not shown in the screenshot display more information about each group.
5.3.3 User Inventory
The final file to be uploaded is a CSV file that defines the ShakeCast users, or those who
will receive ShakeCast emails. There were two iterations of this file for this project: one
which included all relevant ODOT personnel and one which sends an email to an ODOT
email group which ODOT maintains to send to its relevant personnel.
The CSV file contains nine columns: USER TYPE, USERNAME, PASSWORD,
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Figure 5.3: A screenshot from ShakeCast showing uploaded groups.
FULL NAME, EMAIL ADDRESS, PHONE NUMBER, GROUP, DELIVERY:PAGER, and
DELIVERY:EMAIL HTML. The user type for all users is defined as US ER. A user profile
cannot upload and change files like an administration profile can. Each username must
be unique, so each user’s username was taken to be their ODOT email address without
‘@odot.org’. The email and two delivery columns all used the same email address. For
the group column, each user was assigned to all of the divisions. This means that after
an earthquake, every person will receive one email per division with affected bridges.
5.4 Running ShakeCast Scenarios
To test ShakeCast and ensure that it is working properly, earthquake scenarios were
run. The scenarios used were from previous Oklahoma earthquakes. Only two of the
earthquakes Oklahoma has experienced to date (24 April 2017) had shaking levels high
enough to trigger email notifications: the M5.7 earthquake on 6 November 2011, and
the M5.8 earthquake on 3 September 2016.
To load an earthquake, one goes to the Administration tab and then the Earthquakes
tab. Under the Earthquakes tab, there are two ways to fetch earthquakes: fetching from
scenarios or fetching from archives (Fig. 5.4). If one chooses to fetch a scenario, the let-
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Figure 5.4: A screenshot from ShakeCast showing an earthquake.
Figure 5.5: A screenshot of ShakeCast emails for the M5.8 earthquake.
ters “us” prior to the earthquake ShakeMap number are not included (e.g. b0006klz and
10006jxs). If one fetches an event from archives, the “us” is included (e.g. usb0006klz
and us10006jxs). Once a scenario has been loaded, it must be deleted before it can be
loaded and run again. If “trigger” is selected on an event that has already been loaded,
it will delete the event from the ShakeCast Instance and it cannot be retrieved again.
Additionally, after an earthquake has been deleted once, it can only be re-retrieved from
the scenarios bar.
After a scenario has been triggered, one email is received per division affected
(Fig. 5.5). Each email has two parts: the body and an attached PDF. The body of
the email includes a ShakeMap of the earthquake and a list of all affected bridges in the



































U.S. 177 / CIMARRON TP GATE UNDER 5238 1470 X/ 19078 36.3833, 97.0678 Low 13.04
U.S. 177 / BNSF R.R. UNDER 5224 1150 X /19350 36.4572, 97.0678 Low 12.27
U.S. 64 / LONG BRANCH CREEK 5204 1619 X/ 21610 36.2965, 96.9952 Low 12.75
S.H. 108 / CIMARRON TP UNDER 6034 0210 X/ 19063 36.2374, 96.9258 Low 11.19
U.S. 64 / OAK CREEK 5204 1904 X/ 21540 36.3065, 96.9457 Low 9.74
U.S. 177 / LONG BRANCH CREEK 6031 0920 X/ 22013 36.2349, 97.0699 Low 9.09
U.S. 177 / BLACK BEAR CREEK 5224 0223 X/ 28201 36.3227, 97.0676 Low 13.26
U.S. 177 / BLACK BEAR CREEK N O'FLO 5224 0241 X/ 28202 36.3252, 97.0676 Low 13.26
U.S. 177 / BLACK BEAR CREEK S O'FLO 5224 0201 X/ 28200 36.3192, 97.0676 Low 13.26
S.H. 108 / SLWC R.R. UNDER 6028 0801 X/ 26054 36.2334, 96.9261 Low 11.19
U.S. 177 / RED ROCK CREEK 5228 0215 X/ 25020 36.4941, 97.0736 Low 11.2
U.S. 177 / RED ROCK CREEK O'FLOW 5228 0231 X/ 25021 36.4965, 97.0737 Low 11.2
S.H. 15 / LONG BRANCH CREEK 5220 1062 X/ 26443 36.4637, 97.0927 Low 10.44
S.H. 15 / RED ROCK CREEK 5220 0503 X/ 12846 36.4649, 97.1934 Low 7.39
U.S. 177 / SALT FORK ARKANSAS RIVER 5228 0778 X/ 24475 36.5774, 97.0773 Low 9.76
U.S. 177 / SALT FK ARK RVR O'FLOW 5228 0878 X/ 24477 36.5899, 97.0773 Low 9.76
U.S. 177 / SALT FK ARK RVR O'FLOW 5228 0824 X/ 24476 36.5826, 97.0773 Low 9.76
S.H. 66 / DEEP FORK RIVER 5510 1326 X/ 19618 35.6664, 97.2017 Low 6.3
S.H. 15 / LEGEND CREEK 5220 0632 X/ 26444 36.4637, 97.1703 Low 7.44
U.S. 177 / STILLWATER CREEK 6016 0760 X/ 20320 36.0989, 97.0513 Low 5.98
S.H. 66 / SLWC R.R. UNDER 5510 1378 X/ 22647 35.6671, 97.1916 Low 6.3
S.H. 156 / U.S. 60 UNDER 3630 0823 X/ 17545 36.6881, 97.1387 Low 6.29
Figure 5.7: Example ShakeCast email body (cont.).
from all divisions and a list of these bridges (Fig. 5.8). This list included more de-
tailed information about the bridges than in the email body. The information from these
emails can be copied and pasted into Excel to be sorted such that division engineers can
best organize a route to inspect bridges.
5.5 ShakeCast and Radii Comparison
By implementing ShakeCast, ODOT will be able to save money by reducing the number
of bridges inspected. Fig. 5.9 shows the number of bridges inspected using the old radii,
the interim protocol (smart radii), and ShakeCast for the M5.7 and M5.8 earthquakes.
The average cost to inspect a bridge is $55 (W. L. Peters, personal communication,
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Figure 5.8: A screenshot from the emailed ShakeCast PDF.
2016). This means that using the interim protocol, about $32,000 would have been
saved on the M5.7 and about $11,000 was saved for the M5.8. Using Shakecast would
have saved ODOT an additional $8,600 and $7,100 for each of the earthquakes, re-
spectively. Additionally, ODOT will save money by inspecting for fewer earthquakes.
For instance in the year after the interim protocol was implemented (1 April 2016 – 31
March 2017), there were 13 earthquakes that would have required bridge inspections
using the old protocol, 4* using the smart radii, and only 1 using ShakeCast. This re-
sulted in ODOT saving $15,700. Implementing ShakeCast over the same period would
have saved an additional $8,800.
*ODOT currently (24 April 2017) uses a modified version of the proposed smart inspection radii




Figure 5.9: Comparison of the number of bridges to be inspected using the old radii, interim
protocol and ShakeCast for the M5.7 (a) and M5.8 (b) earthquakes.
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5.6 Summary
To develop ShakeCast-OK, HAZUS fragility curves were used with additional reduc-
tions for fracture critical, structurally deficient, and variable skew bridges. This chapter
detailed the steps taken to populate the instance, as well as some of the customiza-
tions made to meet ODOT’s requirements. After populating the instance, it was shown
that by implementing ShakeCast significantly fewer inspections would be required as
compared to the inspection radii because ShakeCast utilizes better data on the ground
shaking levels, improving the potential for damage prediction capabilities.
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Chapter 6
Summary, Conclusions, and Future Work
6.1 Summary and Conclusions
Since 2009, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of earthquakes in Okla-
homa. Therefore, concern has arisen about how Oklahoma’s infrastructure will handle
the increased seismic demand. In particular, ODOT is concerned about their bridges’ re-
sponse to earthquakes and the potential for damage. This research sought to investigate
these concerns. A summary of the areas of study and results is presented below.
The smart inspection radii presented in Chapter 2 incorporate both the demand on
and capacity of Oklahoma bridges. Demand was quantified by the ground-motion in-
tensity, in this case spectral acceleration at a period of 1.0 s (S 1). Predictions of S 1 were
made using the Campbell (2003) ground-motion attenuation model calibrated with a
bias factor correlated to actual seismic station data in Oklahoma. These predictions
were adjusted by a site amplification factor (Site Class D). Inspection radii were set to
be the largest distance from the epicenter at which demand (S 1) exceeds capacity char-
acterized by fragility curves of bridges. A trigger value of S 1 = 5.56%g was selected as
this capacity. The analysis showed that damage to bridges is unlikely (10% probability
of slight damage) for earthquakes with a magnitude less than 4.6.
Chapter 3 compared measured Oklahoma seismic station data to the attenuation
models found in the 2008 USGS seismic hazard map. Most of the attenuation mod-
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els overpredicted Oklahoma ground motions; however, the Atkinson and Boore (2006)
model had the best fit. Note that since the completion of this work, the USGS has
switched from Campbell (2003) to Atkinson and Boore (2006) for ShakeMap ground-
motion predictions in Oklahoma (USGS, 2016e). The response spectra calculated from
seismic stations from the 3 September 2016 M5.8 Pawnee, Oklahoma earthquake were
compared to the AASHTO spectra from those sites. Because the AASHTO design spec-
tra are heavily based off of the Meers fault, the levels of shaking sometimes exceeded
the design curves at locations farther from the Meers fault. Using slight fragility curve
values calculated for previous Oklahoma earthquakes, it was found that the trigger value
is slightly conservative.
Chapter 4 presents the results of a seismic response analysis for the Interstate 35
bridge over the Cimarron River located approximately 40 miles north of Oklahoma
City in Logan County, Oklahoma. The purpose of this study was to improve the under-
standing of the seismic performance of this bridge and to determine the level of effort
involved in performing a finite element analysis for a bridge structure. The results from
this study can also be used to verify and adjust the fragility curve parameters needed for
the development of ShakeCast–OK.
Seismic response analysis has shown that the potential for structural damage is low
under both the 7% probability of exceedance in 75 years and 2% probability of ex-
ceedance in 50 years level events considered. The analysis indicates that the maximum
curvature in the columns was about 25% of the yield curvature, and the maximum de-
flections in the bearings (< 0.5 in.) were all below the deflections prescribed for the
slight damage state.
The final step in preparing ODOT for the emerging seismic threat was the devel-
opment of Shakecast-OK (Chapter 5). To develop ShakeCast-OK, HAZUS fragility
curves were used with additional reductions for fracture critical, structurally deficient,
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and variable skew bridges. After populating the instance, we found that ShakeCast-
OK recommends significantly fewer inspections than the inspection radii because it has
better data on the ground shaking levels.
6.2 Future Work
This research is a first step toward assessing the vulnerability of Oklahoma bridges to
the emerging seismic threat. As a continuation of this research, the following are several
areas which have the potential for further investigation:
• It has been demonstrated that current attenuation models do not accurately model
Oklahoma ground motions. A new attenuation model should be developed to
model the smaller magnitude earthquakes with high-frequency content.
• This research followed the current practice of only examining the effect of hori-
zontal ground motions on bridges. However, more research is needed to examine
how vertical ground motions attenuate and affect bridges.
• It was demonstrated that AASHTO design spectra can be exceeded by seismic
events because these events are not occurring within close proximity to the Meers
fault. Therefore, research needs to be conducted to determine how to incorporate
induced seismicity into the AASHTO design spectra (Petersen et al., 2017).
• This research reduced fragility curves for structurally deficient and fracture crit-
ical bridges. Future research could perform a more rigorous analysis of the
fragility curves for these bridges.
• This research looked at each earthquake that affected a bridge separately. How-
ever, the cumulative effect of repeated small earthquakes on a bridge should be




The conclusions and recommendations presented in this thesis were developed for the
Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) by the researchers from the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma, in accordance with generally accepted civil and earthquake engineer-
ing principles and practices. This report was not prepared to be used by parties other
than ODOT.
Earthquake ground motions are inherently uncertain, and observations of strong
ground motions are limited in Oklahoma. Predictions for strong ground motions are
based on available data and generally accepted attenuation models.
The fragility functions presented in this report are based on standard bridge mod-
els, adjusted for certain bridge characteristics. As a result, actual bridge fragilities may
be different than those represented by the models and other interpretations are possi-
ble. Input parameters for the fragility functions were provided by ODOT, and we have
assumed this information is true and accurate.
The conclusions and recommendations of Chapter 4 are for the seismic evaluation of
structural aspects for the Interstate 35 Bridge over the Cimarron River located in Logan
County, Oklahoma. The bridge was modeled assuming that its condition matched that
described in the plans, which may differ from the actual condition of the bridge. Our
evaluation was performed based on the plans and inspection reports provided by ODOT,
and we have assumed this information is true and accurate.
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Calculating Median S 1 for Standard
Fragility Curves
A.1 Procedure
1. Identify the bridge’s main span material (NBI item 43), skew angle (NBI item
34), number of spans (NBI item 45), year built (NBI item 27), and max span
length (NBI item 48).
2. Use Table A.1 to find the bridge’s HAZUS Class and to determine the K3D equa-
tion number. First, find the row in the “Description” column which matches the
bridge’s information. If the bridge’s max span length is greater than 150 m, it is
HWB1 or HWB2. If the bridge only has one span, it is HWB3 or HWB4. If the
bridge is not either of those, find rows in the table with the bridge’s main span
material in the “Description” column. For bridges made of steel, the max span
length is also used to determine the bridge class (see the seventh column). After
the section with the bridge’s information is found, use the bridge’s year built to
find the HAZUS Class (NOTE: All Oklahoma bridges are Non-CA (see the third
column)). Once the HAZUS Class is found, look through the row once more
to confirm that each column in the row matches the bridge’s information. The
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bridge’s K3D equation number is found in the eighth column.
3. Use Table A.2 to calculate K3D based on the equation number. N is the number
of spans. If N = 1 and causes division by zero, use K3D = 1. NOTE: HWB5,
HWB12, and HWB24 use K3D = 1 regardless of number of spans.
4. Calculate Kskew using the following formula, where α is the skew angle in degrees:
Kskew =
√
sin(90 − α) (A.1)
Table A.1: HAZUS Bridge Classification Scheme (FEMA, 2003, Table 7.2).
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Table 7.2 HAZUS Bridge Classification Scheme 













Design Description  
HWB1 All  Non-CA < 1990  > 150 N/A EQ1 0 Conventional Major Bridge - Length > 150m 
HWB1  All  CA < 1975  > 150 N/A EQ1 0 Conventional Major Bridge - Length > 150m 
HWB2  All  Non-CA >= 1990  > 150 N/A EQ1 0 Seismic Major Bridge - Length > 150m 
HWB2  All  CA >= 1975  > 150 N/A EQ1 0 Seismic Major Bridge - Length > 150m 
HWB3  All  Non-CA < 1990 1   N/A EQ1 1 Conventional Single Span 
HWB3 All  CA < 1975 1   N/A EQ1 1 Conventional  Single Span 
HWB4  All  Non-CA >= 1990 1   N/A EQ1 1 Seismic  Single Span 
HWB4  All  CA >= 1975 1   N/A EQ1 1 Seismic  Single Span 
HWB5 101-106 Non-CA < 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Conventional Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support -Concrete 
HWB6 101-106 CA < 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Conventional  Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support - Concrete 
HWB7 101-106 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic  Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support - Concrete 
HWB7 101-106 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic  Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support - Concrete 
HWB8 205-206 CA < 1975     N/A EQ2 0 Conventional Single Col., Box Girder - Continuous Concrete 
HWB9 205-206 CA >= 1975      N/A EQ3 0 Seismic  Single Col., Box Girder - Continuous Concrete 
HWB10 201-206 Non-CA < 1990     N/A EQ2 1 Conventional Continuous Concrete  
HWB10 201-206 CA < 1975     N/A EQ2 1 Conventional  Continuous Concrete  
HWB11 201-206 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Concrete  
HWB11 201-206 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Concrete  
HWB12 301-306 Non-CA < 1990     No EQ4 0 Conventional Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support -Steel 
HWB13 301-306 CA < 1975     No EQ4 0 Conventional  Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support - Steel 
HWB14 301-306 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic  Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support - Steel 
HWB14 301-306 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic  Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support - Steel 
HWB15 402-410 Non-CA < 1990     No EQ5 1 Conventional Continuous Steel 
HWB15 402-410 CA < 1975     No EQ5 1 Conventional  Continuous Steel 
HWB16 402-410 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Steel 
HWB16 402-410 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Steel 
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Table 7.2 HAZUS Bridge Classification Scheme (Continued) 
CLASS NBI Class State 
Year 













Design Description  
HWB17 501-506 Non-CA < 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Conventional 
Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Prestressed 
Concrete 
HWB18 501-506 CA < 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Conventional 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Prestressed 
Concrete 
HWB19 501-506 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Prestressed 
Concrete 
HWB19 501-506 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Prestressed 
Concrete 
HWB20 605-606 CA < 1975     N/A EQ2 0 Conventional 
Single Col., Box Girder - 
Prestressed Continuous 
Concrete 
HWB21 605-606 CA  >= 1975     N/A EQ3 0 Seismic 
Single Col., Box Girder - 
Prestressed Continuous 
Concrete  
HWB22 601-607 Non-CA < 1990     N/A EQ2 1 Conventional Continuous Concrete 
HWB22 601-607 CA < 1975     N/A EQ2 1 Conventional  Continuous Concrete 
HWB23 601-607 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic Continuous Concrete 
HWB23 601-607 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Concrete 
HWB24 301-306 Non-CA < 1990     Yes EQ6 0 Conventional Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support - Steel 
HWB25 301-306 CA < 1975     Yes EQ6 0 Conventional  Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support - Steel 
HWB26 402-410 Non-CA < 1990     Yes EQ7 1 Conventional Continuous Steel 
HWB27 402-410 CA < 1975     Yes EQ7 1 Conventional  Continuous Steel 
HWB28          All other bridges that are not classified 
 
EQ1 through EQ7 in Table 7.2 are equations for evaluating K3D.  K3D is a factor that 
modifies the piers’ 2-dimensional capacity to allow for the 3-dimensional arch action in 
the deck.  All of the equations have the same functional form; K3D = 1 + A / (N – B), 
where N is the number of spans and the parameters A and B are given in table 7.3. 
 
The Ishape  term (given in table 7.2) is a Boolean indicator.  The Kshape factor is the 
modifier that converts cases for short periods to an equivalent spectral amplitude at T=1.0 
second. When Ishape = 0, the Kshape factor does not apply.  When Ishape = 1, the Kshape factor 
applies.  Later in this section, the use of the Kshape factor will be illustrated through an 
example. 
 
The 28 bridge classes in Table 7.2 (HWB1 through HWB28) reflect the maximum 
number of combinations for ‘standard’ bridge classes.  Attributes such as the skeweness 
and number of spans are accounted for in the evaluation of damage potential through a 
modification scheme that is presented later in this section. 
Table A.2: Coefficients for Evaluating K3D (FEMA, 2003, Table 7.3).
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Table 7.3 Coefficients for Evaluating K3D 
Equation A B K3D 
EQ1 0.25 1 1 + 0.25 / (N – 1) 
EQ2 0.33 0 1 + 0.33 / (N) 
EQ3 0.33 1 1 + 0.33 / (N – 1) 
EQ4 0.09 1 1 + 0.09 / (N – 1) 
EQ5 0.05 0 1 + 0.05 / (N) 
EQ6 0.20 1 1 + 0.20 / (N – 1) 





Tunnels are classified as bored/drilled or cut & cover.    
   
7.1.6 Definitions of Damage States 
 
A total of five damage states are defined for highway system components.  These are 
none (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5). 
 
Slight/Minor Damage (ds2) 
 
• For roadways, ds2 is defined by slight settlement (few inches) or offset of the 
ground. 
 
• For bridges, ds2 is defined by minor cracking and spalling to the abutment, 
cracks in shear keys at abutments, minor spalling and cracks at hinges, minor 
spalling at the column (damage requires no more than cosmetic repair) or 
minor cracking to the deck 
 
• For tunnels, ds2 is defined by minor cracking of the tunnel liner (damage 
requires no more than cosmetic repair) and some rock falling, or by slight 
settlement of the ground at a tunnel portal. 
 
 
Moderate Damage (ds3) 
• For roadways, ds3 is defined by moderate settlement (several inches) or offset 
of the ground. 
 
5. Based on the HAZUS Class, use Table A.3 to find the S 1=S a(1.0 sec) for damage
functions due to ground shaking.
6. To calculate the new median S 1 for moderate, extensive, and complete damage
states, multiply the respective value found in Table A.3 by K3D and Kskew.
7. The median S 1 for slight damage state is taken to be 0.0833g for all bridge types
(Section 2.2).
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Table A.3: Damage Algorithms for Bridges (FEMA, 2003, Table 7.7).
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Table 7.7 Damage Algorithms for Bridges 
 Sa [1.0 sec in g’s] for Damage Functions  due to Ground Shaking 
PGD [inches]  for Damage Functions 
due to Ground Failure 
CLASS Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 
HWB1 0.40 0.50 0.70 0.90 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB2 0.60 0.90 1.10 1.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB3 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB4 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB5 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB6 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.90 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB7 0.50 0.80 1.10 1.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB8 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.80 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB9 0.60 0.90 1.30 1.60 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB10 0.60 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB11 0.90 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB12 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB13 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.90 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB14 0.50 0.80 1.10 1.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB15 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.10 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB16 0.90 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB17 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB18 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.90 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB19 0.50 0.80 1.10 1.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB20 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.80 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB21 0.60 0.90 1.30 1.60 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB22 0.60 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB23 0.90 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB24 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB25 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.90 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB26 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.10 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB27 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.10 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
HWB28 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.70 3.9 3.9 3.9 13.8 
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A.2 Example
Given: I-40 over the Arkansas River (NBI 170510000000000): 10-span; 0 deg skew;
Structure Length 606 m; Max Span Length 101 m; Year Built 1967; Main Span Material
Steel Continuous.
1. Identify: main span material = steel continuous; skew angle = 0◦; number of
spans = 10; year built = 1967; max span length = 101 m
2. Use Table A.1 to determine K3D equation number based on the HAZUS Class.
3. Use Table A.2 to calculate K3D based on the equation number.










sin(90 − α) =
√
sin(90 − 0) = 1
5. Based on the HAZUS Class, use Table A.3 to find the S 1 for damage functions
due to ground shaking.
6. Calculate the new median S 1 for moderate, extensive, and complete damage
119
states.
S 1(Moderate) = 0.75 × K3D × Kskew = 0.75 × 1.005 × 1 = 0.75375g
S 1(Extensive) = 0.75 × K3D × Kskew = 0.75 × 1.005 × 1 = 0.75375g
S 1(Complete) = 1.10 × K3D × Kskew = 1.10 × 1.005 × 1 = 1.1055g
7. Calculate the new median S 1 for slight damage state.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I-35/Cimarron River Bridge Supple-
mental Information
C.1 Superstructure Details




Figure C.2: Pier details. Taken from Proj. No. I–456–(16) plans.
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C.3 Bearing Details
Figure C.1: High-type steel bearing details. Taken from Proj. No. I–FI–35–4(97)166 plans.










































































































































Figure C.1: Ground surface motions used in seismic analysis — 7% PE in 75 years: (a) 1980
Irpinia 294-TRC000; (b) 1991 Umbria Marche 4340-NZ1090; (c) 1991 Umbria Marche 4350-
0000; (d) 2009 L’Aquila 4472-XTE; (e) 2009 L’Aquila 4503-YLN.
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(a) time (sec)






























































































Figure C.2: Ground surface motions used in seismic analysis — 2% PE in 50 years: (a) 1980
Irpinia 294-TRC000; (b) 1991 Umbria Marche 4340-NZ1090; (c) 1991 Umbria Marche 4350-
0000; (d) 2009 L’Aquila 4472-XTE; (e) 2009 L’Aquila 4503-YLN.
130
C.5 Nielson (2005) Limit States
Table C.1: Prescriptive limit states for bridge components taken from Nielson (2005).
Component Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
RC Column (µφ) 1.0 1.58 3.22 6.84
High-Type Steel Bearing – Fixed
longitudinal (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 10.0
transverse (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 10.0
High-Type Steel Bearing – Rocker
longitudinal (in.) 1.97 3.94 5.91 10.0
transverse (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 10.0
Expansion-type Elastomeric Bearing
longitudinal (in.) 1.18 3.94 5.91 10.0
transverse (in.) 1.18 3.94 5.91 10.0
Table C.2: Bayesian updated limit states for bridge components taken from Nielson (2005).
Component Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
RC Column (µφ) 1.29 2.10 3.52 5.24
High-Type Steel Bearing – Fixed
longitudinal (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 7.35
transverse (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 7.35
High-Type Steel Bearing – Rocker
longitudinal (in.) 1.47 4.10 5.36 7.35
transverse (in.) 0.24 0.79 1.57 7.35
Expansion-type Elastomeric Bearing
longitudinal (in.) 1.14 4.10 5.36 7.35
transverse (in.) 1.14 3.58 5.60 7.68
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